Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
6-2021

Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency, and Democratic
Control
Hannah Bloch-Wehba
Texas A&M University School of Law, hbw@law.tamu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure
Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency, and Democratic Control, 109 Calif. L.
Rev. 917 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1503

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Visible Policing: Technology,
Transparency, and Democratic Control
Hannah Bloch-Wehba∗
Law enforcement has an opacity problem. Police use
sophisticated technologies to monitor individuals, surveil
communities, and predict behaviors in increasingly intrusive ways. But
legal institutions have struggled to understand—let alone set limits
on—new investigative methods and techniques for two major reasons.
First, new surveillance technology tends to operate in opaque and
unaccountable ways, augmenting police power while remaining free
of meaningful oversight. Second, shifts in Fourth Amendment doctrine
have expanded law enforcement’s ability to engage in surveillance
relatively free of scrutiny by courts or by the public. The result is that
modern policing is not highly visible to oversight institutions or the
public and is becoming even less so.
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In light of these informational dynamics, transparency litigation
has become a core technique for rendering obscure investigative
practices visible and holding police accountable. These new lawsuits
form a criminal procedure “shadow docket”—they resolve important
questions about democratic governance of policing without deciding
on the constitutionality of searches and seizures. This Article builds on
the government secrecy literature to explore the significance of this
“shadow docket” and the relationship between transparency
obligations and constitutional limits on police action. In the absence
of meaningful Fourth Amendment safeguards, transparency litigation
makes policing practices increasingly visible to the public and
democratic institutions in areas where constitutional criminal
procedure today has minimal reach. These efforts to make policing
visible bear important lessons for advocates and scholars of criminal
procedure, criminal justice reform, and transparency itself.
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INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement has an opacity problem. 1 Police use sophisticated
technologies to monitor individuals, surveil communities, and predict behaviors
in increasingly intrusive ways. But legal institutions have struggled to
understand—let alone set limits on—new investigative methods and techniques
for two major reasons. First, new surveillance technology tends to operate in
opaque and unaccountable ways, augmenting police power while remaining free
of meaningful oversight. Second, shifts in Fourth Amendment doctrine have
expanded law enforcement’s ability to engage in surveillance without oversight
or scrutiny by courts or the public.
Consider police use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR)
technology. ALPRs are cameras, often mounted at intersections or in police
patrol cars, that photograph the license plates of passing vehicles and
automatically screen them against a “hot list” of vehicles linked to crime. 2 Using
ALPRs, police can track a vehicle’s movements throughout a city over time—
creating a pervasive account of a car’s location. Critics have grown concerned
that ALPRs appear to be used disproportionately in low-income and non-White
communities. 3 In one stunning example of an ALPR contributing to police error,

1. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 503, 504 (2018); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 911 (2006); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1108–14
(2000); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1848–
50 (2015); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 187–96 (2008);
Barry Friedman, Secret Policing, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 100–05; Heidi Kitrosser, “MacroTransparency” as Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV.
1163, 1199–1200 (2007) (examining programmatic national security secrecy); Catherine Crump,
Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1606, 1629, 1640 (2016); Anil
Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 69 (2014).
2. Tanvi Misra, Who’s Tracking Your License Plate?, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/12/automated-license-plate-readers-privacy-data-securitypolice/576904/ [https://perma.cc/B3J3-3JPG].
3. Dave Maass & Jeremy Gillula, What You Can Learn from Oakland's Raw ALPR Data,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/what-we-learnedoakland-raw-alpr-data [https://perma.cc/67DK-YXJ6]; see also Ángel Díaz & Rachel LevinsonWaldman, Automatic License Plate Readers: Legal Status and Policy Recommendations for Law
Enforcement Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations
[https://perma.cc/7WQ4-GDUJ] (“The NYPD has used license plate readers as part of its widespread
surveillance of Muslim communities in the New York and New Jersey area.”).
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police detained a Black family and forced them to lie on the ground after an
ALPR flagged their minivan’s license plate as a match to a stolen motorcycle. 4
While it might be public knowledge that ALPRs exist, their particulars are
often invisible to the public or oversight institutions. Civil society organizations
and individuals concerned about the privacy and racial justice ramifications of
ALPRs have turned to transparency law to uncover these practices. In 2015, the
news outlet Ars Technica obtained 4.6 million ALPR records from the Oakland
Police Department after filing a California open records request and then
published a story about the privacy implications of license plate tracking. 5 In
Coral Gables, Florida, Raul Mas Canosa filed an open records request with the
city seeking all the records it had on his car and then sued the city for violating
his privacy rights. 6
The Constitution regulates policing primarily through the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement and prohibition of “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” 7 But courts have consistently held that the use of ALPRs is not a
“search” and that defendants may not exclude evidence obtained through a
license plate reader. 8 Although police use of ALPRs is common knowledge—
scholars and press outlets have discussed the systems at length—drivers may
never learn that their particular location has been tracked, unless they are
ultimately charged with a crime and ALPR evidence is brought against them. 9
Modern policing depends on an array of techniques and technologies, like
ALPRs, that are not considered “searches and seizures” and therefore lie outside

4. Teo Armus, Colorado Police Apologize over Viral Video of Officers Handcuffing Black
Girls
in
a
Mistaken
Stop,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
4,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/04/aurora-pd-handcuffs-family-gunpoint/
[https://perma.cc/YX59-BQST].
5. Cyrus Farivar, We Know Where You’ve Been: Ars Acquires 4.6M License Plate Scans from
the Cops, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 24, 2015), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/we-knowwhere-youve-been-ars-acquires-4-6m-license-plate-scans-from-the-cops/
[https://perma.cc/6X5PCX34]. A similar set of records separately obtained from Oakland police demonstrated that the ALPRs
were disproportionately used in low-income neighborhoods. See Maass & Gillula, supra note 3.
6. Emma Cueto, ‘Why Is My City Monitoring Me?,’ LAW360 (Dec. 1, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1223225/ [https://perma.cc/5RNX-5U3H].
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007) (collecting
cases).
9. For general discussion of ALPRs, see Misra, supra note 2; Julia M. Brooks, Drawing the
Lines: Regulation of Automatic License Plate Readers in Virginia, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2019);
Lauren Fash, Automated License Plate Readers: The Difficult Balance of Solving Crime and Protecting
Individual Privacy, 78 MD. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2019); Stephanie Foster, Should the Use of Automated
License Plate Readers Constitute a Search After Carpenter v. United States?, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 221
(2019); see also Amanda Levendowski, Trademarks as Surveillance Transparency, 36 BERKELEY
TECH.
L.J.
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
15–20),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544195
[https://perma.cc/8R2X-ZW8F]
(describing how federal trademark register discloses information about Vigilant Solutions’ ALPR
systems).

2021]

VISIBLE POLICING

921

of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. 10 These practices are not subject to
longstanding Fourth Amendment safeguards, including ex ante judicial review
and the exclusionary rule. 11 Even surveillance techniques that might be
considered “searches and seizures” often occur as part of “programmatic” and
“suspicionless” police methodologies that are warrantless, data-driven, and not
designed to generate convictions. 12 Standing doctrine also shields many of these
programs from legal challenges. 13
ALPRs also exemplify the significant consequences of police surveillance
not just for individual rights, but also for public and democratic oversight.
Sophisticated policing technologies such as large DNA databases, social media
monitoring, and facial recognition are often implemented without robust
oversight or public awareness. 14 The result is that law enforcement techniques
that rely on advanced technologies are often less visible to individual targets, the
judicial branch, and the public than their physical counterparts. 15 This relative
secrecy impedes efforts to rein in law enforcement activities through legislative

10. See, e.g., Jeramie D. Scott, Social Media and Government Surveillance: The Case for Better
Privacy Protections for Our Newest Public Space, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 151, 158–59 (2017)
(describing how Fourth Amendment doctrine does not protect social media posts “knowingly
expose[d]” to the public eye); Christopher L. Izant, Equal Access to Public Communications Data for
Social Media Surveillance Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 242 (2017) (“There is no Fourth
Amendment ‘search’ when the government views what a person makes public.”).
11. The exclusionary rule is the requirement that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution” is inadmissible in court. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961).
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See David Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
77, 89 (2018) (describing how stringent Fourth Amendment standing rules “have put many search and
seizure methods; means; and programs beyond the reach of effective Fourth Amendment regulation”).
14. See, e.g., Kade Crockford, The FBI Is Tracking Our Faces in Secret. We’re Suing., ACLU
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/the-fbi-is-tracking-our-faces-in-secretwere-suing/ [https://perma.cc/S5CH-HWW3]; Caroline Haskins, Amazon Requires Police to Shill
Surveillance
Cameras
in
Secret
Agreement,
VICE
(July
25,
2019),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mb88za/amazon-requires-police-to-shill-surveillance-cameras-insecret-agreement [https://perma.cc/5QHX-H8BE]; Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might
End
Privacy
as
We
Know
It,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
18,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html
[https://perma.cc/BJV8-JF4K].
15. This dynamic is partly attributable to the unique set of rules that constrains transparency of
digital searches. See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Exposing Secret Searches: A First Amendment Right
of Access to Electronic Surveillance Orders, 93 WASH. L. REV. 145, 153 (2018) (“Routine sealing of
court records . . . implicates the public’s right of access to judicial records and proceedings.”); Stephen
Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
313, 322–26 (2012) (discussing existing statutory provisions in Electronic Communications Privacy Act
that foster electronic surveillance secrecy). It is also partly due to the political economy of surveillance
technology. As Julie Cohen notes, “As digital technologies and capabilities furnished to the government
by private contractors have become more central to national security and law enforcement operations,
both the privileged status of trade secrets and the legal justifications asserted for protecting secrecy have
changed.” JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 133 (2019).
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or administrative oversight, litigation, and policymaking. 16 In other words,
doctrinal and technological developments yield distinctive informational
dynamics: even as law enforcement expands the amount and types of information
they collect about communities and individuals, the public and other
stakeholders have remained comparatively in the dark about these practices. In
light of these changes, transparency litigation has taken on a newly significant
role in revealing investigative practices, stimulating public debate, and fostering
meaningful democratic oversight.
Today, both formally and informally, many disputes about policing are
about transparency. Transparency litigation, by which I mean litigation to
compel the disclosure of government records, has become a core technique for
rendering obscure investigative practices visible and holding police
accountable. 17 These lawsuits form a sort of criminal procedure “shadow
docket.” Although transparency litigation does not determine the merits of any
law enforcement practice, program, or technology, these cases are nonetheless
of central importance to criminal procedure and policing because they shape the
conditions for institutional oversight, policy changes, and public resistance.
Therefore, transparency litigation helps to resolve important questions about the
democratic governance of policing without deciding on the constitutionality of
searches and seizures. 18
Accordingly, transparency litigation is not the primary mechanism through
which the courts directly constrain criminal procedure or policing. Nonetheless,
as this Article demonstrates, this docket meaningfully influences the protection
of Fourth Amendment rights and values by rendering policing increasingly
16. Although the dominant strain of criminal procedure scholarship was long focused on the
scope of constitutional rights, modern approaches are shifting to consider how other institutions might
promote these and other values outside of the courts and outside of the “conventional paradigm” of
constitutional law. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 781 (2012)
(“[L]egal scholars considering the problem of policing . . . overwhelmingly take constitutional law to be
their method . . . .”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1128–29 (1996) (“Not all sensible rules of criminal procedure can or should
be constitutionalized.”).
17. This litigation often takes the form of statutory open records or First Amendment lawsuits
brought by journalists, news organizations, civil society organizations, or movement activists. See infra
Part III; see also Jonathan Manes, Secrecy & Evasion in Police Surveillance Technology, 34 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 503, 512 (2019) (“Until there is a critical mass of public disclosure and public awareness,
courts and legislatures generally do not publicly weigh in on the constitutional or statutory limits on the
police’s use of the novel technology.”).
18. Other commentators have used the term “shadow docket” to denote the Supreme Court’s
non-merits orders and summary decisions, which do not resolve the merits of disputes but nonetheless
have significant and enduring legal implications. William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s
Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 4–5 (2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s non-merits
rulings as a “shadow docket” worthy of study); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the
Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123 (2019); Steve Vladeck, Symposium: The Solicitor General, the
Shadow
Docket and
the
Kennedy Effect,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct.
22,
2020),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-the-solicitor-general-the-shadow-docket-and-thekennedy-effect/ [https://perma.cc/49KS-6KQX] (suggesting that the “shadow docket” “record[s]
everything other than the justices’ formal rulings in argued cases”).

2021]

VISIBLE POLICING

923

visible to the public and democratic institutions. Indeed, transparency law is
often now a critical advocacy tool for those seeking to hold law enforcement
accountable and a critical component of efforts to shift public opinion,
complementing the work of courts and oversight institutions. These efforts to
stop intrusive policing practices are vital complements to traditional Fourth
Amendment remedies and the relief available under civil rights law.
This Article’s focus on democratic accountability brings together two
distinct literatures considering the promise—and pitfalls—of broadening general
public participation in and access to government. First, this Article links the
secrecy and opacity of surveillance methods and practices to the burgeoning
scholarly literature that proposes ways of making police more accountable and
more democratic—including by abolishing, defunding, or stripping police of
their power and resources. 19 Amidst a nationwide uprising against police
violence and oppression in 2020, movements and advocates have called for
dramatic changes to policing. Some transparency-oriented reforms have already
taken place, and others are underway. 20
Second, policing also provides a new context for considering how the
visibility of controversial government practices impacts democratic selfgovernance. In particular, the critical role of law enforcement transparency
litigation is a modest counterargument to progressive critics of “open
government” concerned that “transparency” is a thinly-veiled effort to weaken
programs and agencies designed to promote the public welfare, promoting
“reactionary” and regressive politics. 21 But shining an unflinching light on the
perils and failures of twenty-first century policing is consistent with the
movements’ political inclinations to dismantle or substantially reduce law

19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See Eric Umansky, We’re Publishing Thousands of Police Discipline Records That New
York Kept Secret for Decades, PROPUBLICA (July 26, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/nypdcivilian-complaint-review-board-editors-note [https://perma.cc/EKN9-QZFN]; Saja Hindi, Colorado
Among First in U.S. to Pass Historic Police Reforms Following Protests, DENVER POST (June 13, 2020),
https://www.denverpost.com/2020/06/13/colorado-police-reform-bill-passes-legislature/
[https://perma.cc/KY7R-MEDH]; Angel Idowu, #ReleaseTheRecords Movement Seeks Release of
Police
Misconduct
Files,
WTTW
NEWS
(July
23,
2020),
https://news.wttw.com/2020/07/23/releasetherecords-movement-seeks-release-police-misconduct-files
[https://perma.cc/ETZ3-UD67]; Kyle Wiggers, NYC Passes POST Act, Requiring Police Department
to
Reveal
Surveillance
Technologies,
VENTUREBEAT
(June
18,
2020),
https://venturebeat.com/2020/06/18/new-york-city-council-passes-law-requiring-nypd-to-reveal-itssurveillance-technologies/ [https://perma.cc/38FW-YABC].
21. David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2017) [hereinafter Freedom of Information]; David E. Pozen, Transparency’s
Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 151 (2018) [hereinafter Ideological Drift] (arguing that the
Freedom of Information Act aggravates a “mounting adversarialism” between government and public);
Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 932 (2006) (expressing skepticism
that open government laws can address “populist fears of secrecy, especially those that are deep-seated
and lead to an all-encompassing distrust of the political order”).
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enforcement power. 22 Examining the uses of transparency law and litigation in
the context of law enforcement highlights the systemic importance of
information—or the lack thereof—on efforts to change, curb, or altogether cease
policing practices. And it underscores the integral role of contestation, resistance
to authority, and “agonistic participation” in government institutions while
acknowledging the potentially serious costs of those forms of participation to
legitimacy. 23
As the nation continues to reckon with police violence toward Black
individuals and communities, changes to police surveillance and investigative
tactics are overdue. As Devon Carbado has written, the law of police
investigations shapes law enforcement’s interactions with the public and can lead
to brutality, oppression, and violence. 24 The deaths of George Floyd, Breonna
Taylor, Atatiana Jefferson, Eric Garner, Philando Castile, Alton Sterling,
Michael Brown, Terence Crutcher, Keith Lamont Scott, Deborah Danner, Walter
Scott, Laquan McDonald, Akai Gurley, John Crawford III, and countless others
killed by police show that lives are very much at stake. Quantification, datadriven tools, and predictive techniques are reshaping policing, but killings,
brutality, and misconduct remain. 25 Substantial informational asymmetries
confront organizers, advocates, and legal institutions who seek to change
policing: police agencies often fight to conceal their technologies from the public
and oversight institutions. 26
But new police technology also creates new opportunities for transparency.
Police technology entails reams of data and large numbers of government
records: vendor proposals, contracts, training manuals, frequently asked
questions, and many more artifacts. When it comes to transparency, police
technology has two faces: it can conceal and expose information vital to both
accountability and oversight. 27 The result is that, while policing may be more
secretive than in past eras, changes in policing practice may also have made
transparency litigation a more feasible accountability strategy.
22. Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 408 (2018)
(emphasizing the Movement for Black Lives’ focus on “shrinking the space of governance now reserved
for policing, surveillance, and mass incarceration”).
23. Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1613 (2017).
24. Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 131 (2017) (“Fourth Amendment
doctrine expressly authorizes or facilitates the very social practice it ought to prevent: racial profiling.
This authorization and facilitation exposes African Americans not only to the violence of frequent police
contact but also to the violence of police killings and physical abuse.”).
25. See Aaron Shapiro, Predictive Policing for Reform? Indeterminacy and Intervention in Big
Data Policing, 17 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 456, 460–61 (2019) (describing how police agencies view
predictive policing as a reformist tool).
26. See also Manes, supra note 17.
27. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue Data, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 561, 567–68 (2019) (“New data surveillance systems built by the police can also be used to
monitor systemic and recurring police practices.”).
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This Article makes three contributions. First, it demonstrates how doctrinal
and technological changes have exacerbated obstacles to transparency and have
made it increasingly difficult to check policing. 28 Second, this Article observes
that the informational dynamics of modern policing affect the efficacy of
oversight institutions and community control mechanisms alike. While
transparency law is increasingly fueling advocacy efforts by movement groups
and grassroots organizations, it has also become a critical tool for formal
institutions engaged in monitoring and oversight.
Finally, this Article considers the lessons these informational dynamics
bring to efforts to reform police governance. Transparency values lie at the core
of procedural justice and democratic policing, two approaches intended to repair
the “legitimacy” of criminal law enforcement institutions. Transparency is
equally essential to the progressive and abolitionist project of recentering
affected communities in control and oversight of policing. By relying on open
government tools, reformers seek to shed light on criminal law enforcement
institutions in the interests of promoting community control and accountability. 29
Examining these efforts provides a modest rejoinder to those who are skeptical
about the value of transparency and “open government” to democratic
governance and public trust. 30
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I begins by briefly reviewing how
scholars have invoked openness values in constitutional law and criminal
procedure. Part II highlights how Fourth Amendment doctrine can promote
information-forcing and sets forth how the shift from an individualist, warrantbased model of policing toward a programmatic, reasonableness-based model

28. Policing is not the only context in which advocates have looked to transparency law in the
absence of standing. Similar moves are visible in settings as disparate as voting rights, reproductive
rights, immigration, and national security. This Article saves for another day, however, a fuller analysis
of the ways in which onerous standing and pleading requirements, barriers to discovery, and other
impediments to relief have led advocates to turn to transparency law as the initial part of a “two-step
litigation” strategy.
29. See, e.g., Dan Sloan, A World Without Prisons: A Conversation with Mariame Kaba,
LUMPEN
MAGAZINE
(Apr.
7,
2016)
http://web.archive.org/web/20190503093113/http://www.lumpenmagazine.org/a-world-withoutprisons-a-conversation-with-mariame-kaba/ (“Transparency does help very much to give the
community tools and information that they need to advocate for themselves and their kids around these
issues.”); Stops, Transparency, Oversight and Protection Act (STOP Act), WE CHARGE GENOCIDE,
http://wechargegenocide.org/stop.act/ [https://perma.cc/A2S9-FWRZ] (calling for the passage of the
Stops, Transparency, Oversight and Protection Act (STOP Act) to require Chicago police to share data
on
stops);
Right
to
Know
Act,
CMTYS. UNITED FOR POLICE REFORM,
https://www.changethenypd.org/RightToKnowAct [https://perma.cc/FTF4-QRTA] (calling for the
passage of the Right to Know Act to require NYPD to identify themselves and articulate a reason for a
stop or other civilian encounter).
30. See, e.g., Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 151 (illustrating that declining trust in
institutions may be related to demands for more transparency); Fenster, supra note 21, at 949
(“Transparency advocates’ failure to recognize the impossibility of achieving perfect democratic
governance and a thoroughly informed and engaged public results in a frustrating and often ineffective
legal regime.”).
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has strained law enforcement transparency. Part III documents how, in response
to the erosion of procedural and substantive Fourth Amendment protections,
current efforts to reform policing draw on both the formal mechanisms of
transparency litigation and the animating values of transparency law—
democratic self-governance, participation, and accountability. Part IV considers
the normative benefits and potential drawbacks of relying on transparency’s
“shadow docket” to advance the law of policing. Part V explores lessons for
reform efforts to improve law enforcement transparency and oversight.
I.
TRANSPARENCY AND CHECKABILITY
To contextualize the informational dynamics that afflict policing, this
Section begins by surveying how constitutional theorists have justified openness
and transparency as essential qualities of democratic governance. Despite the
controversial nature of open government mandates, advocates for criminal law
enforcement reform have embraced principles of transparency and open
government as central to the project of democratizing police.
A. Information as Political Check
The assumption that openness in government is critical to democracy runs
deep throughout democratic theory and constitutional law. 31 At least in theory,
the flow of information from the government to the public is a key aspect of
popular sovereignty. 32 But informational flow within government might be
equally significant. As Heidi Kitrosser has described it, one might envision
secrecy as existing along a “spectrum” that can signal whether a secret is more
or less troubling to democratic norms. 33 In David Pozen’s terminology, a secret
is “deep” if government actors work to “conceal[] its existence from the public
and from other officials,” frustrating both public oversight and checks and
balances. 34 On the other end of the spectrum, a secret is “shallow” if “ordinary
citizens understand they are being denied relevant information and have some
ability to estimate its content.” 35 To understand the depth of a secret, one might

31. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 21, at 898 (describing theoretical and political assumptions
“that the publicity of open government produces an informed and interested public, and by implication,
that secrecy caused by opaque or closed government produces suspicious and/or ignorant masses”);
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1168 (2017)
(“Improved transparency leads to increased accountability.”).
32. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 489, 515 (2007). But see, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of
Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
249, 251–52 (2004) (describing the Court’s “erratic and fragmented” approach to newsgathering).
33. Kitrosser, supra note 32, at 514.
34. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 274 (2010).
35. Id.
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consider whether the policy of secrecy is, itself, visible, politically accountable,
and reversible. 36
The “deep/shallow” distinction is important not just to the public but also
to interbranch oversight. As Kitrosser has put it, a “shallow” secret is more likely
to be conducive to “political[] checkability,” because a legislature is more
capable of exercising political control over secrets that it knows exists. 37
Publicity about government policy choices might also promote legislative
oversight indirectly by stimulating constituent concerns 38 or prompting
investigative reporting 39 that leads to legislative oversight. 40 “Shallowness”
does not, standing alone, ensure that legislative controls will prove effective, but
it is a necessary precondition for oversight. 41 Accordingly, determining what
kinds of information ought to be disclosed, to whom, and when, has
constitutional implications. 42
What Kitrosser calls “openness legislation”—statutory interventions that
promote informational flow either among the branches or between the

36. Kitrosser, supra note 32, at 515.
37. Id. Kitrosser thus concluded that the executive branch should be permitted to operate in
secret, subject to any statutory limitations enacted by Congress. Id. at 528.
38. See, e.g., Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Giving Others a Voice in Congress, One HandDelivered
Letter
at
a
Time,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
17,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/us/politics/herd-on-the-hill-constituent-outreach.html
[https://perma.cc/AJJ3-7QB9] (explaining that an organization of 300 volunteers “deliver[ed] more than
12,000 letters to congressional offices on behalf of constituents seeking to inject a human element into
the issues roiling the country”).
39. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Jesse Drucker, Lawmakers Increase Criticism of ‘Opportunity Zone’
Tax Break, N.Y. Times (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/business/opportunityzones-congress-criticism.html [https://perma.cc/DG9L-G3YA] (“Congressional Democrats are calling
for investigations and legislative fixes in the wake of reporting by The [New York] Times.”).
40. According to this theory, a lack of information is partly to blame for historically anemic
congressional oversight of controversial executive branch national security programs, such as
programmatic communications surveillance, rendition and detention, and blacklisting of travelers. See
Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information
Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2008) (discussing Bush Administration’s notification of the
“Gang of Eight” regarding warrantless wiretapping); Jenny-Brooke Condon, Illegal Secrets, 91 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1099, 1115 (2014) (warrantless wiretapping); Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the
Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007); Ian MacDougall, Note,
CIPA Creep: The Classified Information Procedures Act and Its Drift into Civil National Security
Litigation, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 668, 699 (2014) (discussing no-fly list litigation); Justin
Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE
L.J. 2148 (2006).
41. See Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1931, 1951 (2007) (describing the state secrets privilege as an attempt to “narrow federal
jurisdiction” and simultaneously deprive Congress and the courts of authority to regulate government
secrecy).
42. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 32; Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 241 (2015); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909 (2006); Jonathan Hafetz, A Problem of
Standards?: Another Perspective on Secret Law, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2141 (2016); Jonathan
Manes, Secret Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 803 (2018).
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government and the people—plays a critical role in promoting checkability. 43
“Open government” statutes that require government entities to disclose records,
such as the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and its state equivalents,
are paradigmatic examples of openness legislation. 44 These statutes generally
create a presumption that government records should be disclosed to a member
of the public upon request, exempt certain categories from disclosure, and create
a private right of action that permits individuals to enforce these mandates. 45
“Open government” statutes are polarizing. Critics of these statutory
frameworks charge that “open government” principles do little to promote
accountability for government practices but rather tend to empower moneyed
interests, undercut the legitimacy of the state, and devalue personal privacy. 46
As Mark Fenster argues, transparency advocates often rely upon a “deeply
populist” vision of the state, one in which “a distant, secretive bureaucracy rules
the nontransparent state” in ways that are estranged from the popular will. 47 And
the evidence that open government obligations across a broad array of areas
have, in fact, improved governance is scant. 48 Instead of fostering oversight by
investigative journalists and civil society, open government laws have invited
business lobbyists into the legislative and administrative state. They have
permitted right-wing organizations to “reframe facts, obscure the overall shape
of government activity, and sow alienation.” 49 In their current form, critics
contend, transparency obligations are not only unnecessary to advance a
reformist agenda but are in fact sometimes counterproductive, serving neoliberal
ends. 50 These critics also doubt that “open government” and freedom of
information can meaningfully check the most egregious forms of secrecy. 51

43. Kitrosser, supra note 32, at 514 (explaining that openness obligations are “antagonistic” to
deep secrecy and conducive to checkability).
44. Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 118 (describing FOIA as the “canonical”
openness legislation).
45. Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra note 21, 1102–03.
46. See Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 123 (“In its actual application, however,
transparency has become increasingly associated with institutional incapacity and with agendas that seek
to maximize market freedom and shrink the state.”); see also Mark Fenster, Seeing the State:
Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 628 (2010) (“[T]ransparency . . . offers a highly
charged metaphor of a corrupt, secretive state that must be made visible.”); Julie E. Cohen, The Inverse
Relationship Between Secrecy and Privacy, 77 SOC. RSCH. 883, 890–91 (2010) (observing that ideals
of “openness” underwrite corporate surveillance and monetization of personal information); Kate
Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839, 854 (2019) (recognizing many scholars “have
argued that there are serious tradeoffs that come with overreliance on visibility”).
47. Fenster, supra note 46, at 629.
48. See Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 127–32.
49. Id. at 149–50.
50. Id. at 147–48.
51. Id. at 155–56 (“[E]ven as the transparency laws of the 1960s and 1970s placed increasingly
onerous demands on the domestic policy process, they grew increasingly detached from the state’s most
violent and least visible components.”).
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B. Law Enforcement Transparency
Strikingly, though, advocates of reforming law enforcement and criminal
justice institutions appear not to share these doubts. 52 Calls for police
transparency make headlines on a regular basis. 53 Advocacy groups and reporters
painstakingly reconstruct details of police-union contracts 54 and use-of-force
incidents. 55 Civil society organizations demand statutory changes to promote
transparency in police-civilian encounters, surveillance oversight, and bodycamera law. 56 Scholars have embraced these calls, situating transparency as a
central pillar in efforts to promote public trust in law enforcement, police
accountability, and compliance with the law itself.
Contemporary theories about how to improve policing and reduce its
footprint in American communities reflect growing and shared commitments to
transparency as a potential remedy for law enforcement’s precarious relationship
with the public. 57 Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, for instance, argue
52. Kate Levine is a notable exception and has argued that the focus on transparency and
disclosure for police disciplinary records is misplaced. See Levine, supra note 46, at 846.
53. See, e.g., Jodi S. Cohen & Jennifer Smith Richards, Police Oversight Ordinance Promised
Transparency
but
Doesn’t
Fully
Deliver,
PROPUBLICA
(Nov.
13,
2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/copa-chicago-police-oversight#:~:text=Accountability
[https://perma.cc/VDR2-Y3T6]; Editorial, Charlotte’s Mayor, City Council Need to Answer These
Questions About Police Shooting Video, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 22, 2019),
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/editorials/article229534219.html [https://perma.cc/MGR9EEUV]; Editorial, More Police Transparency Can Repair Public Distrust, NEWS-TIMES (May 18,
2019),
https://www.newstimes.com/opinion/article/Editorial-More-police-transparency-can-repair13854753.php [https://perma.cc/QTF9-CTVD]; Christian Morrow, Wolf Vetoes Bill That Would Bar
Identifying Police, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER, Nov. 23, 2016, at A1, A5,
https://newpittsburghcourier.com/2016/11/23/wolf-vetoes-bill-that-would-bar-identifying-police/
[https://perma.cc/A8QR-5BZW]; Robert Mackey, Charlotte Police Chief Refuses to Release Dashcam
Video
of
Officer
Killing
Keith
Scott,
INTERCEPT
(Sept.
22,
2016),
https://theintercept.com/2016/09/22/charlotte-police-chief-refuses-to-release-dashcam-video-ofofficer-killing-keith-scott/ [https://perma.cc/57TK-9CRP].
54. See,
e.g.,
Police
Union
Contract
Project,
CHECK
THE
POLICE,
https://www.checkthepolice.org/ [https://perma.cc/J47P-VNFJ].
55. See,
e.g.,
WASH.
POST:
FATAL
FORCE
(2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/policeshootings [https://perma.cc/C5LQ-3K5H].
56. See Wiggers, supra note 20; Right to Know Act, supra note 29.
57. See infra Part IV.B. There is a large literature on police transparency, but it largely does not
address the secrecy of investigative methods. Many scholars have called for additional transparency for
police as people, noting the urgent need for more accountability for police misconduct. See, e.g., Cynthia
H. Conti-Cook, A New Balance: Weighing Harms of Hiding Police Misconduct Information from the
Public, 22 CUNY L. REV. 148 (2019); Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Open Data Policing, 106 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 1 (2017); Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953 (2017); Rachel Moran,
Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837 (2016); see also Levine, supra note 46. Others
have focused on the uniquely deferential treatment afforded to police agencies in comparison to other
democratic institutions, noting that police seem to enjoy a string of exceptions to general obligations of
transparency, accountability, and oversight. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1; Daphna
Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (2016); Erik
Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000); Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption
of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (2017); see also Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy,
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that “democratic policing” requires that the legal authorities which constrain
other agencies also apply to police. 58 Transparency obligations are no exception.
Proponents of procedural justice see transparency in large part as an important
instrument for attaining public trust. 59 Still others have considered broader
extensions of transparency, including within the grand jury, bail, trial,
sentencing, and plea-bargaining systems, to permit a broader set of actors
(beyond the parties, attorneys, and judges) to oversee or participate in criminal
justice processes. 60
But while a growing consensus supports more transparent policing as a
matter of policy, it has largely failed to grapple with the ways in which new
technologies and doctrinal shifts undermine those efforts by permitting—and
sometimes encouraging—widespread investigative secrecy. 61 These
informational dynamics reflect a fundamental challenge to police reform and to
the democratic legitimacy of policing decisions. Obtaining information about
what the police are doing—the tools they are using, the practices they are
engaged in, and the limits of their activities—is a fundamental predicate to
ensuring that the promise of democratic control (whether by courts, legislatures,
other formal oversight institutions, civil society, social movements, or individual
defendants) is real.
II.
POLICY VISIBILITY IN CONTEXT
While today secrecy norms appear embedded in law enforcement culture
and practice, for decades, law enforcement routinely disclosed fairly extensive
information about how police investigated crime. Longstanding Fourth
Amendment doctrine and practice embrace a variety of “information-forcing”

54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 216–17 (2013) (describing two different situations where law enforcement
agencies enjoy “privileged legal status”).
58. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1, at 1848–49 (describing various types of police
obfuscation and evasion of transparency).
59. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural
Justice, 123 YALE L.J.F. 525, 535 (2014) (“Many judges devote their attention to being fair, i.e., to
correctly applying the law to the facts of each case, but do not think about how they can communicate
that they are being fair to the parties in the case or to the public more generally.”).
60. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 2173 (2014); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (2016); Jocelyn Simonson,
Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559 (2016);
Lauren M. Ouziel, Prosecution in Public, Prosecution in Private (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); Jenia I. Turner, Transparency in Plea Bargaining, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973 (2021); Laura
I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297 (2012); Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731 (2010); Andrea
Kupfer Schneider & Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark: The Need for Transparency and Data in
Plea Bargaining, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 434 (2019).
61. Cf. Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119
(2013) (considering efforts to prompt law enforcement to produce, collect, and share data about
policing).
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mechanisms, most notably through the requirement to obtain a search warrant
and give notice to the target of a search. 62 The erosion of these requirements has
had significant and well-documented effects on individual privacy and on nonWhite communities. 63 The impact on transparency and democratic governance,
however, has been relatively underappreciated. Diminished Fourth Amendment
protections have also made it much more difficult for courts, defendants, and the
public to get critical information necessary to check the police. The hypothetical
scenarios that follow illustrate these shifts and demonstrate how parallel
evolutions in legal doctrine and in law enforcement practice have created
opportunities for law enforcement to act in secret, yielding substantial
transparency gaps.
A. Three Policing Scenarios
The “canonical fact pattern[s]” of criminal procedure involve discrete,
physical encounters between individuals and law enforcement. 64 Likewise, the
canonical Fourth Amendment cases primarily involve individual defendants
seeking to suppress evidence that was gleaned from an allegedly unlawful search
or seizure 65 or individual plaintiffs seeking relief for an unconstitutional harm. 66
62. “Information forcing” is often linked to contract theory. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,
99–100 (1989) (discussing how information asymmetries can lead to inefficient and suboptimal
contracting outcomes); Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 501–03
(2008) (discussing information-forcing contracting rules in the context of Hadley v. Baxendale). But
discussions of information-forcing have found their way into other areas of the law as well, including
criminal procedure. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1407, 1479 (2011) (“In the criminal procedure context law enforcement officers and agencies are
sophisticated repeat players in the best position to collect, aggregate and report data and rationales.”);
see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 861 (2006) (environmental law); Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2012) (pleading standards); Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The
Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2017)
(multidistrict litigation).
63. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 659 (1994) (“[B]eing stopped for nothing—or almost nothing—
has become an all-too-common experience for some Americans since 1968, when the United States
Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio.”); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 333, 364–65 (1998) (noting that the Terry Court was “troubled” by the racial impact of stop and
frisk, although it ultimately blessed the practice).
64. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536 (2005);
see also Renan, supra note 57, at 1051 (“Modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence developed around
a transactional conception of the police-citizen encounter that, in turn, framed the legal tests governing
search and seizure.”).
65. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
66. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 364 (2009) (describing
Section 1983 action against school district for strip search of thirteen-year-old girl); City of Ontario v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 746 (2010) (describing Section 1983 action against city and police department for
reviewing text messages received on official pager); Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989)
(describing Section 1983 action against county police for roadblock that killed a suspect); see also Floyd
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Yet this doctrinal orientation toward individual rights sometimes overlooks more
basic questions about what different actors involved with law enforcement
investigations know about policing. The presumption of Fourth Amendment
doctrine is that individuals know when their persons, houses, papers, or effects
are searched, that courts have an opportunity to weigh in on the constitutionality
of a search, and that the legislature can respond to intrusive police conduct by
enacting laws that constrain police investigations. As these scenarios
demonstrate, these presumptions are not always supported.
1. Scenario 1.
An undercover police officer investigating you for participating in a fraud
conspiracy visits your office under false pretenses while you are out. Telling the
receptionist that they are a friend, they rifle through your papers and,
unbeknownst to you, steal several documents. Six months later, the police apply
for a warrant to search your office for “letters, papers, documents, and writings”
relating to the conspiracy. 67 When the undercover officer testifies before the
grand jury, you find out about the secret theft of the documents.
The undercover officer’s conduct was not only a search: for a time, it was
also a secret. 68 Because the officer did not apply for a warrant, law enforcement
did not inform, much less seek the approval of, a “neutral and detached
magistrate” before performing the search. 69 Nor did the officer leave notice or
an inventory behind them, which would have permitted you to know that the
search took place and that documents were taken. But the search did not stay a
secret for long: you eventually found out because the officer’s testimony was
critical to the criminal case against you.
2. Scenario 2.
An urban police department engages in a pattern of stopping, questioning,
and frisking individuals based on reasonable suspicion that they are engaged in
crime, are about to engage in crime, or are armed and dangerous. The stops occur
in public, often with witnesses present. 70 It is common knowledge that thousands
of people are stopped and frisked each year and that only a small proportion of
those stopped are ultimately arrested on any charge. When asked to release the
aggregate data on the stop-and-frisk program, which would include demographic

v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing Section 1983 action against
New York for unlawful stop-and-frisk policy).
67. Gouled v. United States, 264 F. 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1920), certifying questions to 255 U.S.
209 (1921).
68. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 209, 305 (1921).
69. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
70. Nicholas K. Peart, Opinion, Why Is the N.Y.P.D. After Me?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/young-black-and-frisked-by-the-nypd.html
[https://perma.cc/W2PD-MDGQ].
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information about the individuals stopped, the reasons for stops, and the
locations of stops, the police decline to do so. 71
The stop-and-frisk program is not a secret. 72 Individuals obviously know
that they have been stopped, questioned, and frisked; those who have not had
such encounters with the police often know somebody who has. Communities,
civil society organizations, and social movements coalesce around protesting the
practice. But while stop-and-frisk is no secret, it still is not transparent. The data
that police refuse to produce would provide information critical to understanding
how the program functions and how it might produce or rely upon racial bias.
That data is essential for meaningful oversight by city councils, by courts asked
to review the program’s constitutionality, and by members of the press and
public seeking to hold the police to account.
3. Scenario 3.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains a search warrant directed
to an electronic communication service provider, seeking access to the contents
of your email. The FBI also obtains a separate court order “commanding” the
recipient not to notify any person of the existence of the order. 73 As a result, the
service provider turns over access to your emails but remains barred from
informing you of the search. While the federal government publishes no data
about how frequently it uses email search warrants or nondisclosure orders,
communication service providers reportedly receive tens of thousands of search
warrants each year. 74
The searches are not a complete secret, but nor are they transparent.
Because the search and the nondisclosure orders are issued by the court, they
enjoy some supervision by a magistrate. 75 However, the recipient of the warrant
is gagged from speaking about it, and you are unaware that your emails have
been searched. 76 Unless you are charged with a crime and move to suppress the
evidence, you may never find out that the search occurred at all. 77 The result is
that while the search is known to the judicial branch, it remains a secret to you—
the individual affected—and to the public. 78
B. A Taxonomy of Law Enforcement Visibility
While the primary function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
individual rights to privacy and security, its facilitation of public knowledge,
71. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing NYPD’s reluctance to release stop-and-frisk data).
72. See Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and
Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 43 (1968).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).
74. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 15, at 161.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2705.
76. See Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 895 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2705.
78. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 15.
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oversight, and participation in governance are important secondary effects. 79 In
this Section, I offer some potential ways of characterizing these considerations—
following Kitrosser—as a spectrum that considers how visible policing is to
different actors and at different moments. 80 Considering the flow of information
about policing—transparency of what, to whom, and when—helps to explain the
conditions that make democratic oversight of police more or less robust.
1. Visibility of What?
We might begin with the principle that the fact that a search has occurred
is usually public. For example, an ordinary, physical search of a home—what
Orin Kerr has called the “canonical fact pattern” of Fourth Amendment law—
takes place only pursuant to a warrant. 81 By its nature, the warrant requires
disclosure by the police to a magistrate: the police must describe the thing to be
searched with particularity and establish probable cause for the search. 82
The fact of a search is ordinarily made plain to the target as well.
Continuing with the canonical case of a home search, the occupant may well be
home to observe the search taking place. 83 For instance, the rules governing
physical searches of the home include the requirement that the police “knock and
announce” before entering. 84 Today, the “knock and announce” rule is often
described as a pragmatic one: by announcing their purpose before entering a
home, police avoid threats to their own safety and to those of the home’s
inhabitants. 85 But “knock and announce” is rooted in the requirement of notice
to the target of a search. 86
The principle of notice also protects a person’s right to know that they have
been searched after the fact. In the seminal case of Wilkes v. Wood, 87 a dissenting
79. See, e.g., Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, supra note 60, at
2184.
80. Kitrosser, supra note 32.
81. Kerr, supra note 64; see also Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing
Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912–18 (2010) (exploring the
typical search of the physical home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83. See, e.g., Schitt’s Creek: Our Cup Runneth Over (Feb. 11, 2015) (depicting the Rose family
observing as the revenue agency seizes all their assets in the first scene of the series).
84. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
85. 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 6.2(a) (6th ed. 2020), Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2020) (“(1) [I]t reduces the potential for
violence to both the police officers and the occupants of the house into which entry is sought; (2) it
guards against the needless destruction of private property; and (3) it symbolizes the respect for
individual privacy summarized in the adage that “a man’s house is his castle.” (quoting United States v.
Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4 (9th Cir.1973))).
86. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (finding that the Fourth Amendment
“seems to require notice in the form of an express announcement by the officers of their purpose for
demanding admission”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 49 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)
(noting the requirement that officers announce their “purpose and authority” before entering a home is
“of the essence of the substantive protections which safeguard individual liberty”).
87. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489; Lofft, 1.
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printer filed an action for trespass after the government searched and seized all
of their papers; a chief objection to the blanket search was that the searchers had
failed to leave an inventory behind. 88 At a minimum, the logic ran, the
government had to inform the target of what had been taken.
The warrant requirement mitigates secrecy in a second way, by requiring
the police to obtain judicial approval prior to a search, facilitating interbranch
oversight. The search warrant requirement thereby drastically lowers the secrecy
with which law enforcement can act, even though magistrates ordinarily keep
warrants sealed until after they are returned executed. The decision to seek a
search warrant fosters transparency values in significant ways by bringing
judicial oversight into a criminal investigation early on. 89 And it is not simply
that the warrant requirement compels law enforcement to obtain permission from
a separate branch of government: it also imposes substantive and procedural
obligations to identify both the reason for the search (by giving probable cause)
and the result of the search (by returning the executed warrant with an inventory
of what was seized).
The fact that a search has occurred is fairly open to the public as well. Other
witnesses might observe the search taking place. Even if not, the search warrant
itself is typically a matter of public record. 90 The fact that a search has occurred,
then, is ordinarily revealed to a broad audience shortly after it happens. But
public knowledge can be much richer: disclosure of search warrant records may
establish the reason why an individual was searched and, more specifically, what
was searched or taken.
This is, of course, a highly stylized description of the ways that Fourth
Amendment doctrine requires disclosure of certain kinds of information. There
are plenty of exceptions to these principles. When officers search a home, they
might reasonably determine that announcing themselves would aggravate, not
mitigate, the risk of violence. 91 If the search occurs when the occupant is not
home, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that notice be given and
an inventory be left. 92 However, so-called “sneak-and-peek” warrants permit law
enforcement to conduct a search but delay notice to the target for a period of
thirty days or more. 93
88. Id. at 498 (“The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons houses, break
open escrutores, seize their papers, [and] upon a general warrant, where no inventory is made of the
things thus taken away, and where no offenders names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a
discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall.”).
89. See Pozen, supra note 34, at 308.
90. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 15, 173–74.
91. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995) (“[L]aw enforcement interests may also
establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.”).
92. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(D).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b); see Jennifer Daskal, Notice and Standing in the Fourth Amendment:
Searches of Personal Data, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 437, 442 (2017); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The
Fatal Flaws of the “Sneak and Peek” Statute and How to Fix It, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 121 (2014).
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Perhaps most significantly, Fourth Amendment doctrine has shifted in ways
that limit the protections outlined in the preceding paragraphs. The numerous
exceptions and carveouts to the so-called “warrant requirement” have led rueful
commentators to liken it to “a piece of Swiss cheese.” 94 Relying on the warrant
requirement to ensure transparency in a world in which most searches are
warrantless seems like fragile reassurance indeed. 95 Moreover, to the extent
these presumptions are made meaningful by the existence of potential remedies,
including the exclusionary rule or civil damages, the vanishing availability of
exclusion and the expansion of qualified immunity call those remedies into
question. 96
2. Visibility to Whom?
As the above discussion begins to outline, the scenarios also distinguish
between different figures to whom information might be disclosed—magistrates,
the targets of a search, and the general public. Disclosing a search warrant
application to a neutral magistrate before it is executed is an integral aspect of
Fourth Amendment protections; disclosing it to the target of a search or to the
general public before the search occurs is virtually unprecedented. 97 The result
is that, while policing may be more secretive than in past eras, changes in
policing practice may also have made transparency litigation a more feasible
accountability strategy.

The circuit courts have disagreed about whether the lack of notice is a constitutional issue or simply a
violation of the criminal rules. U.S. v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that notice
was required to render search constitutional). Given the “heavy costs” of excluding evidence, it is
perhaps not surprising that most courts of appeal, including the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits,
have concluded that lack of notice is not a constitutional issue at all, but rather simply a violation of the
criminal rules. See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, and the Fourth
Amendment “Rule Requiring Notice,” 41 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 579–80, 579 n. 397 (arguing the claim that
notice is “not part of the Fourth Amendment at all” is “overstated,” and citing cases).
94. Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609,
1610–11 (2012); see also William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L.
REV. 881, 882 (1991) (“[I]n practice warrants are the exception rather than the rule.”).
95. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1666 (“The little data that exists affirms the suspicion
that warrants are the exception rather than the norm.”); BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING
WITHOUT PERMISSION 7 (2017) (“In a country of just over 300 million people, a rough analysis suggests
state and local police conduct more than 8 million searches annually of pedestrians and automobiles
alone.”); FRANK G. REMINGTON, LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY, DONALD M. MCINTYRE & DANIEL L.
RROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 99–101, 101 n.8 (1967) (describing reliance on search warrants
as rare).
96. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1650–51 (describing the relationship between Fourth
Amendment standards and remedies).
97. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566–67 (1978), superseded by statute,
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a), (b) (declining to impose an obligation of “prior notice and hearing” when police
execute a search warrant at a newsroom).
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First, the “neutral and detached magistrate” plays a critical role in checking
and cabining police discretion. 98 Ex ante disclosure to a magistrate may serve an
instrumental goal: social science research suggests that when police are obligated
to seek a warrant before conducting a search, they reach “better decisions,” either
because they are more aware of the potential consequences of the search or
because they express their reasoning more effectively. 99
But the ex ante judicial review anticipated by the warrant requirement is
doubly important to visibility. By requiring judicial review before a search is
executed, the warrant requirement involves a second branch of government in
essential decision-making about a criminal investigation and thus limits secrecy
within the government itself. 100 As David Pozen suggests, the warrant
requirement can make secrecy shallower: one function of the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement is to “ensure[] that investigative secrecy will
be moved from deeper to shallower before the moment when the search or
seizure actually takes place” by involving the judiciary as a check on the
executive branch. 101 This secrecy-minimizing rationale holds true even if
magistrates are biased toward law enforcement and inclined to approve search
warrants or give them minimal scrutiny. 102 Without an ex ante warrant
requirement, courts would lack any knowledge of or involvement in criminal
investigations until a defendant moves to suppress evidence. 103
Second, the target of a search is equally important in Fourth Amendment
doctrine, although less favored. Most Fourth Amendment cases are presented by
defendants seeking to suppress the fruits of a search. 104 Knowing that you were
the target of a search is vital to making out a Fourth Amendment claim, even if
it is not always sufficient to create standing. 105 This is why parallel
98. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 100 (1959) (describing the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement as replacing “police
control” with “judicial control”).
99. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1638–42.
100. Pozen, supra note 34, at 308; see also Stuntz, supra note 94, at 890 (writing that the warrant
process is unique not because it provides a neutral decisionmaker—which ex post review does as well—
but because of the “timing of the magistrate’s decision” before the search takes place).
101. Pozen, supra note 34, at 308. Pozen, following Rubenfeld, further observes that the idea of
deep secrecy “threatens not only the rule of law but also the sense of personal security that comes with
living in a society governed by the rule of law.” Id. at 309.
102. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1639–40 (documenting concerns about “rubber
stamp” magistrates).
103. Id. at 1651–52 (describing how the ex post suppression model involves judges fairly late in
the game).
104. See Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (2013)
(“[T]he rights of all to be free from police intrusion are protected by an individual with contraband she
seeks to suppress . . . . [B]ecause the harmed party is identified as a criminal at the outset, the balance
starts skewed in favor of the government.”).
105. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding that defendants with neither a “property
nor a possessory interest” in the thing searched or seized lacked standing to invoke the exclusionary
rule); see also Gray, supra note 13, at 88 (“[B]eing a target is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish
eligibility to raise a Fourth Amendment claim.”).
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construction—the practice of “laundering evidence in order to avoid court
review of its actual provenance”—creates Fourth Amendment problems: it
conceals the fact of a search from the target, minimizing the possibility that the
target can raise a Fourth Amendment claim. 106
And third, although the figure of the general public is rarely explicitly
discussed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it is present in practice. Both the
warrant requirement and the exclusionary rule operate to bring the public into
criminal investigations in underappreciated ways. Although search warrants are
issued ex parte, they are usually filed with the clerk after a search is executed.107
Moreover, the dominance of the exclusionary rule as a Fourth Amendment
remedy means the Fourth Amendment is enforced in pretrial hearings, which the
public generally has a right to access. 108 More generally, courts considering
Fourth Amendment claims frequently seek to integrate the broader interests of
society into their analyses of the defendant’s privacy rights and the government’s
interests. 109 For example, when the Supreme Court interprets the exclusionary
rule as the “primary remedy” to vindicate Fourth Amendment rights, it
emphasizes the need to apply the rule only where it “result[s] in appreciable
deterrence.” 110 The Court’s deterrence rationale operates to “protect the
innocent,” 111 those who will never be charged with a crime—and will therefore
never be able to suppress evidence in their own criminal prosecutions.
3. Visibility at What Time?
The foregoing discussion also gestures to a third important aspect of Fourth
Amendment visibility: when do transparency-enhancing interventions take
place? The obvious first step in many cases is at the warrant stage, which takes
a step to minimize law enforcement secrecy while an investigation is still
ongoing. 112 But because search warrants are, today, the exception rather than the
rule, 113 many cases will fail to deliver the ex ante transparency search warrants
otherwise promise. Nonetheless, transparency is rarely delayed for long. In cases

106. Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal
Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 863–64 (2014) (describing how the
government can avoid suppression of evidence by engaging in parallel construction).
107. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
108. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 10 n.3 (1986).
109. See Baradaran, supra note 104, at 39–43 (arguing that courts generally ignore relevant data
about societal factors in assessing whether to suppress evidence).
110. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 454 (1976)).
111. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960), (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
112. Pozen, supra note 34, at 308; Stuntz, supra note 94.
113. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 94, at 1611; see also Pozen, supra note 34, at 308 (arguing
that the warrant exceptions “do not necessarily undermine” the transparency-enhancing potential of the
warrant requirement because most of the exceptions are unlikely “to have been preceded by deep
investigative secrecy”).
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that involve warrantless searches, transparency frequently comes
contemporaneously with the search itself. 114
Even when transparency is achieved only after a search takes place, as the
office-search scenario suggests, it is early enough to allow defendants to move
to suppress and thereby vindicate their Fourth Amendment rights. In other words,
when a defendant raises a notice issue in the context of a suppression hearing,
the law enforcement action being challenged is hardly a secret. 115 If, as Sissela
Bok suggests, a secret is something “intentional[ly] concealed,” a secret search
litigated at a suppression hearing is not a secret at all: it has been laid bare to the
defendant and the public. 116 Challenges to truly secret searches, conversely, will
almost never be presented in suppression hearings, because a defendant will not
know that a secret search has occurred. 117
The limited duration of secrecy in these paradigmatic cases, in turn, also
suggests that the value of requiring notice as a constitutional matter is minimal.
Rather than having been permanently harmed by a lack of notice, defendants
have the information they need to understand that they have been searched—and
to challenge the constitutionality of those searches. Indeed, the procedural
background of most of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which
results from motions to suppress in criminal cases, confirms that defendants do
become aware that their homes or property have been searched, even if it is after
the fact. As a practical matter, the lack of notice may not matter to targets of
searches who ultimately become criminal defendants, because defendants would
ordinarily receive notice during the pendency of a criminal case and would
therefore be able to move to suppress the evidence.
C. The Challenge of Programmatic Policing
Today, police often initially confront individuals through pedestrian or
vehicle stops—routine, low-level encounters that are not a secret. 118 Indeed, the
114. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (search of phone incident to lawful arrest).
115. See Pozen, supra note 34, at 271 (“[T]he depth of a secret decreases to the extent that
members of the community, including their representatives in government, understand that information
is being concealed from them, the basic contours of that information, and how to go about discovering
what it is.”).
116. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 9 (Vintage
Books 1989).
117. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“There may be . . . many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn
up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and about which
we never hear.”).
118. Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, 2016
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 299–300 (2016) (“Police encounters are where the public engages most often
and most profoundly with the police. These encounters can take a variety of forms, from the benign to
the fatal.”); G. Marcus Cole, Dean G. Marcus Cole: ‘I Am George Floyd. Except, I Can Breathe. And I
Can Do Something.,’ U. NOTRE DAME L. SCH.: NEWS (June 8, 2020), https://law.nd.edu/newsevents/news/dean-g-marcus-cole-i-am-george-floyd-except-i-can-breathe-and-i-can-do-something/
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visibility of these encounters, and the ways in which they routinize police
violence against Black people, in particular, fuel the ongoing uprisings against
police violence and repression. In spite of this visibility, warrantless and
“programmatic” policing techniques have also strained existing accountability
mechanisms for searches and seizures. 119 Nowhere is this clearer than in the
context of the “Stop, Question, and Frisk” (SQF) strategy deployed in urban
police departments.
SQF emerged as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio,
which held that law enforcement officers may briefly stop and frisk individuals
for weapons based on a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and
dangerous. 120 Even before Terry, the practice of stopping and frisking
individuals was decades old. 121 But the Terry Court blessed the practice,
recentering “reasonableness” as a key standard for law enforcement interactions
with members of the public. 122 In deemphasizing the more stringent “probable
cause” standard, Terry permitted law enforcement to rely instead on a standard
that is broad, flexible, and subjective. 123 Yet Terry also acknowledged the
possibility that the tactic it permitted would have wider social effects,
particularly for non-White people. Expressing some concern about the
“wholesale harassment” of minority groups, the Court nonetheless concluded
that the practice was constitutional. 124 The “explicit racial component” of police
discretion, which marked “racial incongruity” with one’s surroundings as
suspicious, went unacknowledged. 125
[https://perma.cc/X77B-VEKW] (“The police officer was intent on nothing more than humiliating and
emasculating me in front of my small children, hoping to provoke me to respond. At that moment, I
remember thinking that the most important thing I could do for my sons was to survive the encounter.”);
Peart, supra note 70.
119. By “programmatic” policing, I mean law enforcement tactics that do not proceed from the
identification of an individual crime or suspect, but rather those aimed at “a broad body of the people”
to deter or prevent crime. Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What's "Reasonable": The
Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 281, 286–87 (2016); see also Renan, supra note 57,
at 1042 (defining “programmatic” surveillance as being “designed en masse . . . through administrative
policies”).
120. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
121. See LaFave, supra note 72, at 42 (describing stop-and-frisk as a “time-honored police
procedure” that had been neglected by the courts and scholars).
122. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
123. Id. at 30 (emphasizing that an officer may rely on experience and intuition in justifying their
decision to stop and frisk an individual); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy:
Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1278 (1998) (describing how the
“malleable” Terry standard expanded police discretion, with disproportionate effects on black men).
124. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14–15; see also Maclin, supra note 123, at 1285 (arguing that, although
Terry “seems to recognize that race matters to the Fourth Amendment,” it “clearly occupied a
subordinate position to the Court’s overriding concern about police safety and violent crime”).
125. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 460 n.17 (2000) (“Terry was African
American, McFadden was white. McFadden's ‘professional judgment’ concerning Terry was based on
[Terry’s presence] outside [of a typically] African-American [neighborhood].”); see also I. Bennett
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While Terry seemingly expanded Fourth Amendment coverage, it reduced
law enforcement accountability. Terry extended Fourth Amendment scrutiny to
a broader range of interactions between individuals and police, rejecting the idea
that only the most formal of searches and seizures could infringe individual
rights as “simply fantastic.” 126 Nonetheless, this transformation strained the
prevailing transparency norms. Terry’s conclusion that street encounters
required no search warrant removed ex ante judicial review from the equation,
and with it went a key opportunity for disclosure and oversight. 127 As Wayne
LaFave characterized stop-and-frisk in the immediate aftermath of Terry, it was
not a “dark secret”—everybody knew about it—but the procedural and political
realities of its use rendered it “low-visibility” in the sense that defining or curbing
its use was not a political priority. 128
Terry explicitly focused on the ex ante understanding of the police officer
in a discrete encounter with an individual. 129 But SQF gained traction throughout
the 1990s and 2000s as a key programmatic component of urban policing based
on “Broken Windows,” “zero tolerance,” or “order maintenance policing.” 130
The core principle of Broken Windows is that “disorder and crime are usually
inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence.” 131 Broken Windows
theory, therefore, encouraged police departments to concentrate their resources
in areas of high disorder and granted departments broad discretion in determining
exactly what “disorder” meant. 132 Police departments quickly identified poor
urban neighborhoods, which were frequently home to a predominantly Black and
Latinx population, as the primary targets for “order maintenance” priorities:
Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 68 (2009) (“[L]aw-abiding
minorities in predominantly white communities face disproportionate stops by and encounters with the
police, and law-abiding whites in minority communities face disproportionate stops by and encounters
with the police. The officers in effect function as de facto border control, deciding who is scrutinized,
stopped, questioned, or frisked.” (footnotes omitted)).
126. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1998) (describing the “‘nonsearch’ gambit”).
127. 392 U.S. at 20 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has
not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”); see also Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 383, 401–02 (1988) (describing how the Terry decision altered the “traditional yardstick of
probable cause” and replaced it with “reasonable suspicion” as a “compromise”).
128. LaFave, supra note 72, at 43.
129. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 327, 329 (2015) (describing reasonable suspicion as a “small data” doctrine).
130. Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of
New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1504 & n.39 (2014); Fagan & Davies, supra
note 125, at 462, 467.
131. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/VB5Z-FGTM].
132. Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 875 (2015)
(“Broken windows theory, in its construction of the disorderly, the lawless, and the outsider as legitimate
subjects of policing, rendered already vulnerable individuals as even more vulnerable to policing.”).
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“aggressively enforcing laws against public drunkenness, loitering, vandalism,
littering, public urination, panhandling, prostitution, and other minor
misdemeanors.” 133 By singling out poor neighborhoods for Broken Windows
interventions, police also embraced a place-based strategy that “target[ed] people
of color, particularly African Americans, for stops and frisks.” 134 As the
progenitors of Broken Windows put it in starkly racist language, a neighborhood
might be transformed “to an inhospitable and frightening jungle” unless it
addressed a range of threats: “rowdy children,” “unattached adults,” teens “in
front of the corner store,” littering, “inebriate[s],” panhandling. 135 Stopping and
frisking individuals was an essential element of success for a “quality of life”
strategy designed to increase arrests and tickets for misdemeanors and other lowlevel offenses. 136
The “programmatic” policing techniques that SQF exemplifies bring
unique and disproportionate impacts to poor and minority communities, not just
individuals. 137 As Tracey Meares put it, SQF—and Broken Windows more
generally—is “not simply a tool,” but rather a program that shifts police inquiries
from individual crimes to “suspicious characteristics” of whole communities,
seen through a skewed, racialized lens. 138 In light of the programmatic nature of
SQF, which is “carried out systematically, deliberately, and with great
frequency,” Terry’s focus on the “individual, incident-level” approach seems to
miss the point. 139 Analyzing stops and frisks as discrete, individual incidents
fails to appreciate how their “large scale and ‘group-based’ application” differs
from the traditional, highly individualized model of policing. 140 These
133. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 301 (1998). Notably, while the original proponents of Broken Windows
emphasized “alternatives to arrest and prosecution,” NYPD abandoned these alternatives, focusing
instead on boosting arrests. Fagan & Davies, supra note 125, at 471.
134. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 957 (1999); see also Brett G. Stoudt, Michelle Fine & Madeline Fox, Growing Up
Policed in the Age of Aggressive Policing Policies, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1331, 1347 (2012)
(differentiating between, on the one hand, individual racially motivated stops and, on the other, racially
disparate impact of the SQF program).
135. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 131.
136. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV.
611, 631–32 (2014); Fagan & Davies, supra note 125, at 477 (“[S]tops were disproportionately
concentrated in the city’s poorest neighborhoods, neighborhoods with high concentrations of racial
minorities.”).
137. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE
L.J. 2054, 2139–40 (2017) (framing the “program” as “bigger than systematic Terry stops-and-frisks of
young African American and Latino men,” but rather “endemic to policing itself”).
138. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-andFrisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 168–69 (2015).
139. Id. at 164.
140. Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a
Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2402 (2017); see also Meares, supra note 138,
at 168–69 (noting the programmatic nature of the policies); Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares,
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“ecological” harms, as Aziz Huq has put it, are a poor fit for Fourth Amendment
doctrine’s “transactional frame.” 141
SQF became a key scholarly case study of programmatic policing not just
because it vividly illustrated the impact of policing on entire communities but
also because the traditional Fourth Amendment remedy of exclusion proved
wildly inadequate to address its harms. Communities struggled to hold police
accountable for this practice that was occurring in public, yet somehow out of
the frame of oversight or accountability. As the Terry Court had predicted, the
exclusionary rule would be “powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally
guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are
willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other
goal.” 142
In the context of SQF, one result of Terry was to remove large swaths of
police conduct from judicial oversight altogether, rendering significant aspects
of policing invisible to the courts. 143 According to the Attorney General’s report,
only 6 percent of all SQF stops in New York City resulted in an arrest, and 6
percent resulted in a summons. 144 This left relatively few individuals who could
have moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an unlawful stop and frisk. The
result, as this Article demonstrates in the Section that follows, was that activists,
individuals, and organizations partly turned away from the traditional avenues of
vindicating Fourth Amendment rights and instead strategically deployed
transparency litigation designed to bring SQF into the spotlight and boost its
political salience.
III.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE’S SHADOW DOCKET
Along nearly every axis, the nature of policing has changed dramatically,
calling into question the archetypal contours of Fourth Amendment doctrine. The
realities of modern policing programs and technologies show that the warrant
requirement and exclusionary rule are ineffective safeguards against unchecked,
opaque policing. New technologies of surveillance have strengthened police
departments’ ability to engage in the “low-visibility” strategies first
implemented with stop and frisk and indeed have deepened the shadows around
these practices. In short, against the consensus view that policing ought to be
Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 834–35 (2011) (overviewing
suspicionless search programs).
141. Huq, supra note 140, at 2402, 2450; Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in
Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 (2002).
142. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968).
143. See 392 U.S. at 13 (“[I]n our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the
judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional
guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents.”)
144. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing the
NYPD’s “hit rate”).
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more democratic, more accountable, and more transparent, significant evidence
suggests that new technology and shifts in Fourth Amendment doctrine have
undermined these values. 145
This Section explores one response: the development of what I call criminal
procedure’s
“shadow
docket.”
Criminal
procedure
is
heavily
constitutionalized. 146 Increasingly, however, oversight institutions, individuals,
and civil society organizations have turned to a “shadow docket” of transparency
litigation that does not resolve the constitutional merits of any law enforcement
practice but rather functions as a mechanism to access the data and information
critical to understanding policing practices. Many advocates are deploying a dual
strategy of transparency litigation in tandem with substantive Fourth
Amendment claims to expose programmatic surveillance and policing
technology.
If I am correct that the turn toward transparency litigation has been
prompted by deficiencies in existing constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
frameworks for police accountability, then the “shadow docket” has flourished
because it is one of the few effective strategies at extracting critical information
from law enforcement. But the turn toward transparency litigation to promote
police accountability has also led courts to develop a body of caselaw outside of
the traditional framework of constitutional law that, nonetheless, is salient to
criminal procedure. These efforts, I show, are part of a multiprong strategy to
reform law enforcement and subject it to democratic control.
A. Transparency Advocacy Challenging Programmatic Policing
1. Stop, Question, Frisk
Early in the morning on February 4, 1999, four New York Police
Department (NYPD) officers killed Amadou Diallo, a twenty-two-year-old
unarmed West African immigrant, in a fusillade of forty-one shots outside his
home in the Bronx as he fumbled with his wallet. 147 The officers were stopping
Diallo because he ostensibly resembled a rape suspect, but the stop immediately
went wrong when they interpreted his wallet as a weapon. 148 The officers were
members of the Street Crimes Unit (SCU), an “elite”—and overwhelmingly

145. See supra Part I.B (articulating the consensus view).
146. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 1, 7–8 (1996) (noting some of the perverse incentives created by the constitutionalization of
criminal procedure).
147. Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1, B5, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/nyregion/officers-in-bronx-fire41-shots-and-an-unarmed-man-is-killed.html [https://perma.cc/S4JD-5AXQ].
148. Robert D. McFadden & Kit R. Roane, U.S. Examining Killing of Man in Police Volley, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at A1, B6, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/06/nyregion/us-examining-killingof-man-in-police-volley.html [https://perma.cc/N8BC-X8QL].
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White—squad of almost four hundred officers based at Randall’s Island that
focused on searching for guns as well as other dangers to New York residents. 149
Public outcry was enormous and immediate. 150 Local, federal, and state
officials made clear their intent to investigate the broader circumstances
surrounding Diallo’s murder. 151 Quickly, investigators turned toward the SCU’s
use of “stop and frisk” tactics and other “lower-level” encounters between
civilians and police. 152 Barely a month after Diallo’s murder, a group of Black
and Latinx plaintiffs filed Daniels v. City of New York, the first case to challenge
NYPD’s stop and frisk program. 153
SQF underscores how reform efforts have deployed transparency law and
litigation in tandem with substantive constitutional and civil rights claims to
subject police practices to public scrutiny and democratic oversight. In addition
to the constitutional merits of SQF, transparency about the NYPD’s practices
became a key focal point for efforts to hold the department accountable. Both
understanding and challenging SQF required extensive access to data, which
investigators and legislators quickly demanded NYPD provide. NYPD
“scrambl[ed]” to compile data regarding the SQF program, hiring temporary
workers to comb through all its stop-and-frisk reports—generated on a form
called the UF-250—in order to produce them to investigators and oversight
bodies. 154 Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, who conducted his own investigation
of the program, threatened to subpoena NYPD for “thousands of documents”
when the city refused to hand data over voluntarily. 155 In the end, NYPD
provided UF-250 data from 1994 through April 1999 to federal investigators. 156
The centrality of data to effective oversight also prompted the legislature to act.
149. David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 1999, at A1, B5, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/15/nyregion/success-of-elite-police-unitexacts-a-toll-on-the-streets.html [https://perma.cc/88AB-GSD6].
150. Katherine E. Finkelstein, Protests in Police Killing of Diallo Grow Larger, and More
Diverse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at B12, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/25/nyregion/protestsin-police-killing-of-diallo-grow-larger-and-more-diverse.html [https://perma.cc/WFA6-F582].
151. Michael Cooper, Street Searches by City’s Police Lead to Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
1999, at A1, B6, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/18/nyregion/street-searches-by-city-s-police-leadto-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/3H6C-2LW6].
152. ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK”
PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL 8 (1999); Benjamin Weiser, Frisking Policy of the Police Faces Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1999, at B1, B5, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/19/nyregion/frisking-policy-ofthe-police-faces-scrutiny.html [https://perma.cc/X39M-76TM].
153. Daniels v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
154. Larry Celona, NYPD To Bare ‘Stop & Frisk’ Data, N.Y. POST (Apr. 12, 1999)
https://nypost.com/1999/04/12/nypd-to-bare-stop-exclusive/ [https://perma.cc/H2KJ-GBVE].
155. Kit R. Roane, Spitzer Threatens Subpoena for Police Data on Frisking, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 1999 (§ 1), at 39, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/16/nyregion/spitzer-threatens-subpoena-forpolice-data-on-frisking.html [https://perma.cc/XRB3-Y7P9]. The city ultimately backed down. Kit R.
Roane, Giuliani Agrees to Give the State Police Documents on Frisking, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1999
(§ B), at 5, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/26/nyregion/giuliani-agrees-to-give-the-state-policedocuments-on-frisking.html [https://perma.cc/R2P5-KDRH].
156. Daniels v. City of New York, 200 F.R.D. 205, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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In 2001, the New York City Council enacted the Police Reporting Law, which
required NYPD to produce data regarding the department’s SQF program on a
quarterly basis. 157
Access to SQF data also proved integral to the stop and frisk litigation. In
January 2000, the Daniels parties agreed that the NYPD would produce the UF250 database to plaintiffs subject to certain nondisclosure provisions. 158 When
Daniels settled in 2003, the settlement agreement included the critical
component that NYPD continue to use the UF-250 database to track all SQF
activity—and continue to disclose the data, in redacted form, to the plaintiffs’
counsel on a quarterly basis. 159
Even after Daniels settled, SQF data continued to prove essential to
mobilizing civil society organizations and the public for additional reforms to
the SQF program. 160 In February 2007, NYPD released statistics establishing
that it had stopped, questioned, or frisked over half a million individuals. 161 In
response to widespread negative blowback, NYPD then commissioned the
RAND Corporation to write a report on racial bias in the SQF program. Relying
on data from the NYPD’s computerized UF-250 database, RAND concluded that
the raw statistics “distort the magnitude and, at times, the existence of racially
biased policing” and that “a large-scale restructuring” of the SQF program was
“unwarranted.” 162
But when the city council requested the UF-250 database to perform its
own analysis, NYPD refused to grant it. 163 In response, the New York Civil
Liberties Union filed a Freedom of Information Law request (and then an Article
78 proceeding) seeking access to the UF-250 database. 164 The City vigorously

157. N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 2001/055 (codified as amended at ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, ch. 1, § 14150).
158. Protective Order ¶ 2, Daniels v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(No. 99-CV-01695). The agreement went haywire when the plaintiffs certified a class, leading NYPD
to seek a stay that would allow the agency to avoid producing the UF-250 database to the plaintiffs until
it had exhausted its appeal of the class certification to the Second Circuit. 138 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
159. Stipulation of Settlement at 8, Daniels, 138 F. Supp 2d 562 (No. 99-CV-01695). In addition,
NYPD agreed to engage in some public-facing outreach, including by engaging in several Joint
Community Forums, presenting workshops at local high schools, and revising its “Understanding Your
Rights” pamphlets. Id. at 9–10.
160. See ARIEL E. BELEN, NEW YORK CITY JOINT REMEDIAL PROCESS ON NYPD’S STOP,
QUESTION, AND FRISK, AND TRESPASS ENFORCEMENT POLICIES: FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 43–45 (2018) (“[T]he UF-250 and the later-created UF-250 database have played
a crucial role in the ability of actors outside of the NYPD, including the public, to assess the effectiveness
and constitutionality of the NYPD’s SQF practices over time.”).
161. NYPD, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (NYPD) STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK
DATABASE, 2006 (2008).
162. GREG RIDGEWAY, RAND CORP., ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES, at xiv (2007).
163. Rocco Parascandola, New York Police Will Release Stop-Frisk Reports, MCCLATCHY –
TRIB. BUS. NEWS (Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with author).
164. Verified Petition, N.Y.C.L. Union v. NYPD, No. 115154/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2007).
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argued that disclosure of the UF-250 database would jeopardize security. 165
Disclosing the database, the City argued, would enable a bad actor to reconstruct
the patterns of police officers’ movements and their “enforcement strategies”
throughout the city. 166 The court rejected the argument and ordered NYPD to
release the database, noting that NYPD had already “provided copies of the
database to at least two other outside organizations,” including RAND. 167
The dual strategy of seeking constitutional accountability at the same time
as compelling data access embraced by challengers of stop-and-frisk in New
York City has also gained traction elsewhere. In Philadelphia, for instance, the
police department is subject to ongoing court-appointed monitoring due to its
stop-and-frisk policy. 168 In 2016, the city’s Defender Association filed a lawsuit
seeking access to more granular data about the Police Department’s stop-andfrisk patterns. 169
2. Other “Broken Windows” programs
Similar patterns also arise in other programmatic policing contexts. In early
2012, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) filed an Article 78 petition
seeking information about an NYPD program called “Operation Clean Halls” or
the “Trespass Affidavit Program.” 170 The program, which was decades old,
enlisted private landlords to permit police officers to enter their buildings and
arrest trespassers and loiterers. 171 Two months later, NYCLU attorneys appeared
in federal court in Ligon v. City of New York alongside attorneys from the Bronx
Defenders and LatinoJustice PRLDEF, representing a class of plaintiffs
challenging the program on the grounds that it violated the Fair Housing Act, the

165. The City claimed that the UF-250 database was exempt from disclosure because it
implicated “non-routine criminal investigative techniques or procedures.” Motion to Dismiss at 5,
N.Y.C.L. Union v. NYPD, No. 115154/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 2008) (on file with author).
166. Id. at 6.
167. N.Y.C.L. Union v. NYPD, No. 115154/07, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2008) (“The
NYPD has not offered any reason why the petitioner should be denied access to the same database which
it has already shared with other outside organizations.”). As the FOIL proceeding was pending, Daniel
Floyd and Lalit Clarkson filed a civil rights complaint in federal court alleging that NYPD had a
widespread pattern and practice of improperly stopping and frisking people without reasonable
suspicion. Complaint, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08-CV01034).
168. Bobby Allyn, Stop-and-Frisk Abuses Ebb, but Report Says Some Philly Police Still Ignore
Guidelines, WHYY (Dec. 7, 2017), https://whyy.org/articles/stop-frisk-abuses-ebb-report-says-phillypolice-still-ignore-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/FBK6-ZCVG].
169. Bobby Allyn, Court Battle Looms over Philly Police Refusal to Turn over Stop-and-Frisk
Records, WHYY (Jan. 7, 2016), https://whyy.org/articles/court-battle-looms-over-philly-police-refusalto-turn-over-stop-and-frisk-records/ [https://perma.cc/33WB-P6EN].
170. Verified Petition ¶ 8–9, N.Y.C.L. Union v. N.Y. Cnty. District Attorney, No. 12/100682
(N.Y. Sup. Jan. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 173498.
171. Julie Turkewitz, In New York, a 20-Year-Old Policy Suddenly Prompts a Lawsuit, THE
ATLANTIC (May 1, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/05/in-new-york-a-20year-old-policy-suddenly-prompts-a-lawsuit/256584/ [https://perma.cc/QM8L-CA9R].
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First Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment. 172 Ligon was ultimately resolved
in the same remedies opinion as Floyd v. City of New York. 173
Transparency litigation has continued to play a critical role in exposing
Broken Windows practices to public scrutiny up to the present moment. 174 In
July 2017, New York City Councilmember Rory Lancman introduced a bill to
require NYPD to publish data on the number of arrests and summonses issued
for subway fare evasion on a quarterly basis. 175 The existing data, gleaned by
public defender organizations who represented individuals accused of
farebeating, showed widespread racial disparities. 176 Lancman’s bill, enacted in
2018, required NYPD to begin publishing quarterly reports that included the total
number of fare evasion arrests, disaggregated by district, transit station, and
demographic information of the arrestee. 177
But NYPD did not comply with the law’s disclosure mandates, failing to
publish relevant data regarding arrests at the vast majority of the city’s 472
subway stations. 178 In May 2018, Council Member Lancman, alongside the
Community Service Society (CSS)—a nonprofit organization that advocates for
poor New Yorkers—filed a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request seeking
the data that NYPD had failed to publish. 179 NYPD denied the request, arguing
that releasing the statistical information Lancman and CSS sought—and which
the Department was compelled by statute to disclose—would jeopardize public
safety by permitting statistical analysis that “could be used to deduce the regular
172. Complaint at 50–51, Ligon v. New York, No. 12-cv-2274 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012), ECF
No. 1.
173. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
174. See Guy Padula, Utah v. Strieff: Lemonade Stands and Dragnet Policing, 120 W. VA. L.
REV. 469, 521 (2017) (situating fare evasion arrests within Broken Windows strategy); Anna Flagg &
Ashley Nerbovig, Subway Policing in New York City Still Has a Race Problem, MARSHALL PROJECT
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/09/12/subway-policing-in-new-york-citystill-has-a-race-problem [https://perma.cc/UH9X-BVAS] (same).
175. N.Y.C. Council Int. No. 1664-A, 2017 Council, July 20 Meeting (N.Y.C. 2017) (enacted),
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3106792&GUID=75B76B89-FD404CAF-978F-35D2F26EB913&FullText=1 [https://perma.cc/3YZZ-XT8Z].
176. HAROLD STOLPER & JEFF JONES, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, THE CRIME OF BEING SHORT $2.75:
POLICING COMMUNITIES OF COLOR AT THE TURNSTILE 2 (2017), https://smhttp-ssl58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/Fare_Evasion_FINAL_10_6_17_smaller.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ZUP-NC2S]. The report relied on data from the two public defender organizations in
Brooklyn regarding all their clients who had been arrested on “Theft of Service” charges during 2016.
The report concluded that “the greatest concentrations of theft of service arrests occur around subway
stations nearest to the poorest and predominantly black census tracts.” Id. at 4, 10.
177. N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 2018/047 (amending ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 14-172).
178. Josh Levitt, NYPD Disclosure of Enforcement Data Fails to Comply with Fare Evasion
Reporting
Law,
N.Y.C.
COUNCIL
(Oct.
3,
2018),
https://council.nyc.gov/rorylancman/2018/10/03/nypd-disclosure-of-enforcement-data-fails-to-comply-with-fare-evasionreporting-law/ [https://perma.cc/JUF3-WBK3].
179. Verified Petition, Lancman v. NYPD, No. 19/154329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2019). A few
months later, Lancman and CSS also filed a petition for mandamus, seeking to compel NYPD to comply
with Local Law 47. Verified Petition, Lancman v. De Blasio, 2019 WL 1437894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)
(No. 18/158709).
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deployment of NYPD resources at various stations through New York City.” 180
When Lancman filed an Article 78 proceeding to compel NYPD to disclose the
information, the court rejected the City’s argument as “speculative at best, and
improbable at worst,” and ordered the data disclosed. 181
B. Data-Driven Policing
The SQF litigation exemplifies how the turn from “transactional”
investigations based on individual suspicion to “programmatic” policing
methods has strained public oversight mechanisms and required new ways of
addressing transparency for Fourth Amendment activity. Law enforcement’s
shift toward data-driven policing strategies has further diminished its
visibility. 182 Unlike the classic Broken Windows modalities of policing—such
as stops, frisks, and arrests—data-driven policing practices often do not directly
implicate Fourth Amendment protections. 183 While these techniques might
sometimes be used to investigate individual crimes, they are at least as often used
as “dragnets” intended to sweep up information about large segments of the
public. 184 And while challenges to the constitutionality of physical dragnets such
as roadblocks, administrative searches, and drug testing have come to the Court,
there is little guidance on how the Fourth Amendment might apply to data-driven
policing. 185 Although the Supreme Court in the recent cases of Jones and
Carpenter ruled that pervasive, long-term location tracking is the subject of
Fourth Amendment protection, it remains unclear how those decisions fit with
the longstanding rule that searches of public information are not really
“searches” at all. 186
180. Verified Petition ¶ 47, Lancman v. NYPD, No. 19/154329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2019).
181. Lancman v. NYPD, No. 154329/2019, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 23, 2019) (order
granting petition in part), NYSCEF No. 24.
182. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on
Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 36–37 (2017) (explaining how proprietary interests shield
predictive policing technologies from public knowledge and transparency values).
183. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723 (2014); Renan, supra note 57, at 1056 (noting the
problems programmatic surveillance poses to a traditional, transaction-based Fourth Amendment
framework).
184. Renan, supra note 57, at 1053 (noting that “generalized collection” can quickly transform
into suspicion-based, targeted database searches); Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107–08 (2010) (describing “the power of the executive branch, on its
own or on the basis of vague legislative authorization, to engage in large-scale intrusions into the
citizenry’s houses, persons, papers, and effects in the absence of probable cause”); Friedman & Stein,
supra note 119, at 303–04 (describing the widespread turn to “dragnet searches without cause”).
185. Slobogin, supra note 184, at 120 (suggesting that this is partly because many data-driven
policing strategies occur in secret).
186. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(questioning the application of the third party doctrine in the “digital age”); Carpenter v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (“[A] person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties.” (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979))); 1
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In light of these constitutional dynamics, transparency litigation is a critical
avenue to understanding the implications of contemporary policing strategies.
As documented in this Section, these efforts to expose modern policing
technologies to scrutiny are part of a broader litigation and political strategy to
shift the political discourse as well as the substantive rules that govern law
enforcement investigations. 187
1. Gang Databases
Gang policing—which one National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) attorney called “the new stop and frisk”—
demonstrates how new policing techniques function opaquely and how a
“shadow docket” of transparency litigation has emerged in response. 188 Gang
databases collect information about alleged members of criminal gangs for use
by law enforcement and other agencies. Although gang database practices vary
somewhat among jurisdictions, they tend to have some common features. First,
individuals are usually neither notified that they have been included in a gang
database nor given an opportunity to challenge a designation as a gang member
or affiliate. 189 Second, the criteria for inclusion tend to be unclear, and police
departments have broad discretion to designate individuals as gang members. 190
Third, many agencies tend to permit widespread sharing of information from the
WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.7(g) (6th ed.),
Westlaw (databased updated Sept. 2020) (discussing Fourth Amendment law as it relates to
technological surveillance and suggesting possible ways the Jones and Carpenter decisions alter this
body of law); see also Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1325 n.99 (2002) (“[U]nder
the analysis proposed in this article, facial recognition technology is no different from an officer
comparing a photograph of a known criminal to the faces of people the officer passes in the street.”).
Wayne Logan and Andrew Ferguson have argued that when the police take action “on the basis of a
database error,” such as a false positive match in a facial recognition database, the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of “unreasonable” searches and seizures may be implicated. Wayne A. Logan & Andrew
Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 577 (2016); see also
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 871, 924–27 (2016) (suggesting that errors in automated suspicion algorithms may result
in a Fourth Amendment suppression remedy if they were the result of deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent misconduct).
187. Cf. Manes, supra note 17, at 518–19 (describing how efforts to shed light on the use of
Stingray surveillance technology proceeded in tandem with efforts to constrain their use).
188. Marne Lenox, Assistant Couns., NAACP, Testimony on NYPD’s Gang Takedown Efforts
Before the N.Y.C. Council Comm. on Public Safety 3 (June 13, 2018) (“While the NYPD touts the
declining number of police stops as evidence of its compliance with the law, the Department secretly
continues
to
target,
surveil,
and
catalog
young
men
of
color.”),
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3506401&GUID=43D779AF-FAC6-41229886-87F19EAE5CC6&Options=&Search= [https://perma.cc/8CA5-L2F6]; see also K. Babe Howell,
Gang Policing: The Post Stop-and-Frisk Justification for Profile-Based Policing, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 4–5 (2015) (arguing that aggressive gang policing emerged as a form of social and racial control
after Floyd held SQF unconstitutional).
189. Howell, supra note 188, at 15.
190. Keegan Stephan, Conspiracy: Contemporary Gang Policing and Prosecutions, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1015 (2018).
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databases with other law enforcement institutions. 191 Finally, gang databases are
often inaccurate and raise concern about potential impacts on free expression and
association. 192
As Professor Babe Howell has pointed out, gang policing-by-database
“avoids both public and judicial scrutiny” by taking place in secret. 193 Gang
databases also tend to operate without rigorous public oversight. 194 As a result,
individuals and organizations have turned toward transparency law to lay the
basis for a legal challenge to gang policing tactics.
In New York City, for instance, organizations have employed a strategic
shift toward use of the State’s FOIL to obtain critical information about gang
policing. 195 Although NYPD has repeatedly testified before the New York City
Council in general terms about the Criminal Group Database, it has never made
public the criteria that it uses in determining whether to include an individual. 196
Nor has the city council compelled NYPD to do so. Even NYPD’s definition of
a “criminal group” is unclear. 197 Accordingly, in 2018, the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed an Article 78
proceeding seeking to compel disclosure of records reflecting the criteria for
inclusion in the gang database, demographic information for individuals
included in the database, and documents about the relationship between the gang
191. Mick Dumke, Chicago’s Inspector General Finds the City’s Gang Database Is Riddled with
Errors, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/chicago-police-departmentgang-database-inspector-general-report [https://perma.cc/U2CK-TV7X] (reporting that Chicago’s
database was widely accessible to hundreds of other law enforcement agencies—so many that CPD
couldn’t even list them all).
192. See Noah Hurowitz, NYPD’s Secret Gang Database Filled With ‘Garbage,’ Advocates Say,
DNAINFO (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20171019/civic-center/nypd-gangdatabase-legal-aid-brooklyn-defenders-foil-request/ [https://perma.cc/3MQC-92VL]; Rebecca A.
Hufstader, Note, Immigration Reliance on Gang Databases: Unchecked Discretion and Undesirable
Consequences, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 671, 673 (2015) (describing a “developing federal policy of relying
on gang databases to determine immigration benefits and burdens”); Stephan, supra note 190, at 1014
(“[O]nly one state [California] has any statutory mechanism to challenge being on a gang database or to
be removed from a gang database.”); Shiu-Ming Cheer, NILC and Other Orgs Work to Shed Light on
Gang Databases and Fight the Criminalization of People of Color, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (July 14,
2016), https://www.nilc.org/2016/07/14/9988/ [https://perma.cc/2NW8-TFSK] (documenting
consequences of presence in gang databases, including “increased probability of criminal conviction,
sentence enhancements, loss of employment, and eviction from public housing”); see also Joshua A.T.
Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 986 (2014) (positing that digital
evidence might be used to exonerate defendants).
193. Howell, supra note 188, at 4; see also Stephan, supra note 190, at 1014 (“In some states,
everything about gang databases is specifically exempt from freedom of information requests.”).
194. See Stephan, supra note 190, at 1014 (noting that few states have adopted affirmative
legislation authorizing police use of gang databases).
195. Hurowitz, supra note 192.
196. See id.; see also Hearing on Int. 1645-2019 et al. Before the N.Y.C. Council Comm. on
Public Safety, 2019 Council, June 27 Meeting 31–33 (N.Y.C. 2019) (testimony of Oleg Chernyavsky,
Exec. Dir. of Legis. Affs., NYPD) (describing the criteria for inclusion in the database).
197. Nick Pinto, NYPD Added Nearly 2,500 New People to Its Gang Database in the Last Year,
INTERCEPT (June 28, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/06/28/nypd-gang-database-additions/
[https://perma.cc/2W4W-6B5F].
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database and NYPD’s “Domain Awareness System.” 198 Transparency litigation
has also been a critical avenue for academic researchers and advocates to gain
access to information about the demographics of those whom the city’s Criminal
Group Database includes. 199
Elsewhere in the United States, open records efforts have also
supplemented substantive lawsuits seeking reform of gang policing strategies. In
2018, ProPublica-Illinois obtained access to the de-identified data from
Chicago’s gang database after filing a state open records request. 200 The Chicago
Police Department (CPD) was using a data “warehouse” called the Citizen and
Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting System (CLEAR) to track gang
affiliations based on certain types of inputs, including social media posts, tattoos,
and arrest records. 201 CLEAR, which was developed through a partnership with
Oracle, is part of a broader effort by Chicago police to predict future episodes of
violence. 202 By 2018, when ProPublica published the dataset, CLEAR housed
information about over 128,000 individuals. 203 As ProPublica noted, however,
the accuracy of some of the entries was questionable: the database included
entries for over a hundred people who were over the age of seventy and several
who were over one hundred. 204 Chicago’s Inspector General also audited the
gang database and likewise concluded that it was riddled with errors. 205

198. Verified Petition ¶ 18, NAACP v. NYPD, No. 157383/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2018),
NYSCEF No. 1. That case settled after NYPD complied with the request. See Stipulation of Settlement
and Discontinuance, NAACP v. NYPD, No. 157383/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 2019), NYSCEF No.
34.
199. See Howell, supra note 188, at 15 & n.91 (documenting how she had to file an Article 78
proceeding in order to compel disclosure of statistical information regarding the gang database under
FOIL).
200. Mick Dumke, Chicago’s Gang Database Is Full of Errors—and Records We Have Prove
It, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/politic-il-insider-chicago-gangdatabase [https://perma.cc/S48Y-MZY7].
201. Id.; POLICING IN CHI. RSCH. GRP., TRACKED AND TARGETED: EARLY FINDINGS ON
CHICAGO’S GANG DATABASE, (Janaé Bonsu & Andy Clarno eds., 2018),
http://erasethedatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Tracked-Targeted-0217.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HH32-GCGX]; see also CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “GANG DATABASE” 16-17 (2019), https://igchicago.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/OIG-CPD-Gang-Database-Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KM8-UHHQ]
(listing criteria for designation of individuals as gang-involved).
202. Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR), HARVARD KENNEDY SCH.
ASH
CTR.
FOR
DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE
&
INNOVATION,
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/citizen-and-law-enforcement-analysis-and-reporting-clear
[https://perma.cc/SM8Z-R9EZ]; see also ANDREW G. FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING
39–40 (2017) (describing how Chicago is a “laboratory” for person-based predictive policing
techniques).
203. Dumke, supra note 200.
204. Id.
205. Matt Masterson, Gang Database ‘Strains Police-Community Relations’ City Watchdog
Says, WTTW NEWS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://news.wttw.com/2019/04/11/gang-database-strains-policecommunity-relations-city-watchdog-says [https://perma.cc/ZPE8-8DWP].
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A few months after ProPublica published its report, the MacArthur Justice
Center filed a class action complaint against the City of Chicago and the CPD on
behalf of a number of individual and organizational plaintiffs. 206 The lawsuit
challenged the database on procedural due process, equal protection, and Fourth
Amendment grounds. MacArthur sought an injunction that would require
Chicago to limit the criteria for entry into the database, provide notice and an
opportunity to contest a designation as a gang member, and forbid sharing the
gang data with third parties. 207
Advocates are also resorting to grassroots open records strategies as a
remedy for procedural due process concerns. Because NYPD does not notify
individuals of their inclusion in the database, many of the tens of thousands of
New Yorkers designated as gang affiliates may not even be aware. 208 In 2018,
the Legal Aid Society, along with dozens of other defense and racial justice
organizations, launched “FOIL Yourself,” a campaign they described as
intended “to help impacted people and communities obtain basic transparency
and accountability in how [the] Department classifies New Yorkers as gang
affiliates.” 209 NYPD has reportedly denied each of the FOIL requests it has
received for information that would disclose whether the requesters are in fact in
the Criminal Group Database, citing security concerns. 210 In November 2018,
Keith Shenery, one of the individuals who had FOILed his own records, filed an
Article 78 petition to challenge the NYPD’s decision to withhold them. 211 In
Chicago, a coalition of racial justice movement groups—Mijente, Organized
Communities Against Deportation, and Black Youth Project 100—have also
embraced the grassroots FOIA strategy to help individuals learn whether they

206. Class Action Complaint at 1–2, Chicagoans for an End to the Gang Database v. City of
Chicago, No. 18-cv-04242 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2018), ECF No. 1.
207. Id. at 46–52, 56–58.
208. Pinto, supra note 197 (numbering the Criminal Group Database at 18,084 people).
209. Defenders, Community Groups & Activists Announce “FOIL Yourself” Campaign Against
NYPD
Gang
Database,
LEGAL
AID
SOC’Y
(Feb.
19.
2018),
https://www.legalaidnyc.org/news/2018/2/26/defenders-community-groups-activists-announce-foilyourself-campaign-against-nypd-gang-database [https://perma.cc/PG6K-8BGV]; see Are You in the
NYPD Gang Database?, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, https://legalaidfoil.backspace.com [https://perma.cc/SJ5FPRQ6]; GO FOIL YOURSELF! Join Countless Others in AALDEF’s Campaign to Help You Find Out
What’s in Your NYPD File, ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND (Mar. 27, 2012),
https://www.aaldef.org/press-release/go-foil-yourself-join-countless-others-in-aaldefs-campaign-tohelp-you-find-out-whats-in-your-nypd-f/ [https://perma.cc/MX8Y-C3DV].
210. John Annese, NYPD Tells 350 People They Don’t Have the Right to Know If They’re in a
Gang
Database,
Legal
Aid
Says,
N.Y. DAILY
NEWS
(Apr.
5,
2019),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-legal-aid-challenges-nypd-gang-database-freedom-ofinformation-20190405-jolcfy42o5f3zpqv6nc52bb3uq-story.html
[https://perma.cc/WNB8-LAAU];
Alice Speri, NYPD Gang Database Can Turn Unsuspecting New Yorkers into Instant Felons,
INTERCEPT
(Dec.
5,
2018),
https://theintercept.com/2018/12/05/nypd-gang-database/
[https://perma.cc/7KME-VYJV].
211. Verified Petition, Shenery v. NYPD, No. 160935/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 21, 2018),
NYSCEF No. 1.
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are in CLEAR. 212 In the face of secretive gang policing practices, the shadow
docket is thus playing a critical role in advancing individual rights as well as
public knowledge and political change.
2. Private Sector Partnerships
The informational dynamics of modern policing technologies grow even
more complex when private sector vendors are involved. 213 As Catherine Crump
has documented, law enforcement agencies often begin new surveillance
programs and acquire surveillance tools without disclosing those activities to city
council and other oversight agencies, let alone the public. 214 As a result,
surveillance and other new policing programs are often initiated without any kind
of public input. 215 A web of nondisclosure agreements, some of which purport
to override state open records obligations, often surrounds policing technology
supplied by private-sector vendors. 216
At both the state and federal level, civil society groups, scholars, and
journalists are using open records litigation to shed light on predictive policing
technology, which exemplifies these concerns. 217 In December 2016, the
Brennan Center for Justice filed an Article 78 proceeding in New York to compel
NYPD to release records relating to predictive policing technology. 218 The
Brennan Center noted that NYPD had paid to obtain a software technology called
Gotham from Palantir, a secretive tech company known to provide surveillance
tools to law enforcement. 219 Among other items, the Brennan Center sought
212. About, ERASE THE DATABASE, erasethedatabase.com/about [https://perma.cc/3HUEHNJ4].
213. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1283–84
(2020) (highlighting “proprietary algorithmic governance” mechanisms in policing); Robert Brauneis
& Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 125–
26 (2018) (underscoring the importance of transparency choices for predictive policing algorithms).
214. Crump, supra note 1, at 1640; see also Stephan, supra note 190, at 1014 (noting scarcity of
affirmative legislation authorizing police use of gang databases).
215. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1, at 1886–89 (describing different models for
community engagement, including commissions, oversight boards, and notice-and-comment
rulemaking).
216. See Joh, supra note 182, at 25 (describing nondisclosure agreements cities entered into with
Harris Corporation, the manufacturer of stingray technology, which “impose[d] strict conditions of
secrecy on law enforcement agencies”).
217. See, e.g., Caroline Haskins, Here Are Hundreds of Pages of Official Documents About
Predictive Policing in America, VICE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gya8jm/hereare-hundreds-of-pages-of-official-documents-about-predictive-policing-in-america
[https://perma.cc/YX9V-B7RC] (highlighting the findings of investigative journalists regarding law
enforcement’s use of PredPol); see also Joh, supra note 182, at 24–25 (explaining Harris Corporation’s
insistence on confidentiality).
218. Verified Petition, Brennan Ctr. for Just. v. NYPD, No. 160541/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15,
2016), NYSCEF No. 1.
219. Id. at ¶ 2; see also Rob Copeland & Maureen Farrell, Peter Thiel’s Secretive Data Giant
Palantir Finally Raking in Cash, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2019) https://www.wsj.com/articles/peter-thielssecretive-data-giant-palantir-finally-raking-in-cash-11549540803
[https://perma.cc/GQ34-W5QN]
(characterizing Palantir as “secretive”).
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contracting documents, purchase records, marketing materials from vendors, and
records pertaining to audits of Gotham and other predictive policing tools. 220
Shortly after the Brennan Center filed its petition, the New York City
Council introduced the Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST)
Act, which would require NYPD to conduct an impact assessment of each
“surveillance technology” that it uses. 221 The POST Act is one of a number of
legislative proposals that impose accountability and transparency requirements
on police technology. 222 Unlike many of its stronger counterparts, the POST Act
does not require ex ante legislative approval of surveillance technology but rather
provides oversight through requiring post hoc reports. 223 NYPD nonetheless
objected to even this weak form of oversight, and the bill was stalled for nearly
three years. 224 Finally, in June 2020, the city council passed the POST Act along
with a suite of other reforms. 225
Against this background, the Brennan Center’s effort to bring NYPD’s
predictive policing systems into the open took on more significance. NYPD
claimed that it could not provide records about the audits or test results from
Palantir because the agency had entered into a nondisclosure agreement with
Palantir and the other potential vendors. 226 Releasing information about the
accuracy of NYPD’s predictive policing tools, it claimed, would jeopardize
vendors’ trade secrets. 227 While the court ultimately rejected the trade secrets
claim as unfounded, the developers of proprietary tools such as breathalyzers and
forensic analysis software have advanced similar trade secrets claims in other
law enforcement contexts that impede transparency and accountability

220. Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. New York City Police Dept., No. 160541/2016, 2017 WL
6610414, at *2–3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 27, 2017).
221. The POST Act defines “surveillance technology” broadly to include “equipment, software,
or system capable of, or used or designed for, collecting, retaining, processing, or sharing audio, video,
location, thermal, biometric, or similar information, that is operated by or at the direction of the
department.” N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 2020/065 (amending ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, ch. 1, § 14-188;
N.Y.C. Charter § 803).
222. See
ACLU,
COMMUNITY
CONTROL
OVER
POLICE
SURVEILLANCE,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-overpolice-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/WG4R-HZSW];
BAN
FACIAL
RECOGNITION,
https://www.banfacialrecognition.com/map/ [https://perma.cc/HW64-DY6C] (displaying a nationwide
map of CCOPS and other anti-surveillance legislation).
223. Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy Localism, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1961, 2005 (2018).
224. Id. at 2005–06; see also Albert Fox Cahn, Surveillance and the City: Past Time for the POST
Act, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/8909-surveillanceand-the-city-past-time-post-act-nypd [https://perma.cc/TN4Y-T5YJ] (noting that the bill has been
pending before the Council for over two-and-a-half-years).
225. Wiggers, supra note 20.
226. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. New York City Police Dept., No. 160541/2016, 2017 WL
6610414, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 27, 2017).
227. Id. at *9–10.
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interests. 228 In response, legislators have begun to consider restricting the
assertion of the trade secrets privilege. 229
Similar efforts are apace to expose police use of facial recognition and
surveillance cameras. Law enforcement has turned to private sector vendors,
including Amazon and Microsoft, to provide facial recognition software even in
the absence of affirmative legislation, meaningful civil liberties safeguards, or
transparency obligations. 230 Amazon’s home surveillance subsidiary, Ring, has
also entered into agreements with law enforcement to encourage consumers to
adopt Ring products. Ring is reportedly also working toward implementing facial
recognition within the hardware. 231 The turn toward facial recognition has raised
particular concerns in light of the mixed evidence about the accuracy of its results
and the high potential cost of error. 232 Facial recognition software misidentifies
228. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761–62 (Wis. 2016) (upholding use of proprietary
algorithm at sentencing despite defendant’s lack of access to critical information about how the
algorithm computes risk); see also Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual
Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1372–73 (2018) (questioning whether
necessity is the proper legal burden to apply to discovery and subpoena motions in the context of forensic
DNA analysis systems); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 671–75
(2018); Bloch-Wehba, supra note 213, at 1283–90 (documenting a variety of proprietary algorithmic
methods at different stages of the criminal justice process).
229. Recently proposed legislation would amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to require the
disclosure of source code and other relevant information to criminal defendants in order to challenge
forensic analysis. Press Release, Mark Takano, U.S. Rep., Rep. Takano Introduces the Justice in
Forensic Algorithms Act to Protect Defendants’ Due Process Rights in the Criminal Justice System,
(Sept. 17, 2019), https://takano.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/rep-takano-introduces-the-justicein-forensic-algorithms-act-to-protect-defendants-due-process-rights-in-the-criminal-justice-system
[https://perma.cc/7YA7-WC4J]. In Idaho, the legislature recently enacted a law that requires any pretrial
risk assessment algorithms to be “transparent,” and specifies that “No builder or user of a pretrial risk
assessment algorithm may assert trade secret or other protections in order to quash discovery in a
criminal matter by a party to a criminal case.” H.R. 118, 65th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2019); see also
Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, AI Systems as State Actors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1941, 1945 n.18
(2019) (collecting other state and local initiatives).
230. Hill, supra note 14.
231. See Sam Biddle, Amazon’s Ring Planned Neighborhood “Watch Lists” Built on Facial
Recognition, INTERCEPT (Nov. 26, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/11/26/amazon-ring-homesecurity-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/JRE4-T4CW]; Lauren Goode & Louise Matsakis, Amazon
Doubles Down on Ring Partnerships with Law Enforcement, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.wired.com/story/ces-2020-amazon-defends-ring-police-partnerships/
[https://perma.cc/MS4Q-3BHA]; John Herrman, Who’s Watching Your Porch?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/19/style/ring-video-doorbell-home-security.html
[https://perma.cc/EY4P-DGDY]; Haskins, supra note 14; Alfred Ng, Amazon’s Helping Police Build a
Surveillance
Network
with
Ring
Doorbells,
CNET
(June
5,
2019),
https://www.cnet.com/features/amazons-helping-police-build-a-surveillance-network-with-ringdoorbells/ [https://perma.cc/CL3T-YUAB]; Louise Matsakis, Cops Are Offering Ring Doorbell
Cameras in Exchange for Info, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/cops-offeringring-doorbell-cameras-for-information/ [https://perma.cc/5F9M-VJFT].
232. See Madeleine Gregory, Amazon’s Facial Recognition Misidentified 1 in 5 California
Lawmakers as Criminals, VICE (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ne8wa8/amazonsfacial-recognition-misidentified-1-in-5-california-lawmakers-as-criminals
[https://perma.cc/7Y4DC7GV]; DJ Pangburn, San Diego’s Massive, 7-Year Experiment with Facial Recognition Technology
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Black and Asian faces as potential matches more frequently than it does White
faces and performs particularly poorly for dark-skinned women. 233 At least two
people have been arrested after facial recognition software wrongly flagged them
as matches for criminal suspects. 234
Leading researchers and advocacy groups concerned with the spread of
facial recognition technology, including the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), Georgetown’s Center on Privacy and Technology, and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, rely on open records requests in support of their research
and advocacy. 235 In 2019, the ACLU filed a FOIA lawsuit seeking records
related to the use of biometric surveillance and facial recognition by the FBI and
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 236 STOP Spying recently filed a
lawsuit against the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) after the
agency would not disclose whether surveillance cameras installed in the Times
Square transit hub had facial recognition capabilities. 237 As policing
technologies hoover up vast amounts of private individual data without
oversight, notice, due process, or community input, transparency litigation is
providing a partial avenue to expose these practices—and to push back.
C. Electronic Surveillance
Digital searches are even less transparent than either the traditional,
discrete, “transactional” searches or the more “programmatic” practices that
Appears to Be a Flop, FAST CO. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90440198/san-diegosmassive-7-year-experiment-with-facial-recognition-technology-appears-to-be-a-flop
[https://perma.cc/XJ4Y-3U2D].
233. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in
Commercial Gender Classiﬁcation, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 77, 84 (2018).
234. Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html
[https://perma.cc/N5RM-9PJB]; Elisha Anderson, Controversial Detroit Facial Recognition Got Him
Arrested for a Crime He Didn’t Commit, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 10, 2020),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/07/10/facial-recognition-detroitmichael-oliver-robert-williams/5392166002/ [https://perma.cc/Q9EB-2T9R].
235. See, e.g., The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO.
L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH.,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technologycenter/publications/the-perpetual-line-up/ [https://perma.cc/8EGN-RC8N] (relying on over 100
freedom of information requests to gather information about police use of facial recognition); Matt Cagle
& Nicole Ozer, Amazon Teams Up with Government to Deploy Dangerous New Facial Recognition
Technology, ACLU (May 22, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/amazon-teams-government-deploy-dangerous-new
[https://perma.cc/4TQG-64W8]
(describing public records requests to jurisdictions partnering with Amazon to deploy its “Rekognition”
facial recognition system); Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., EFF Sues FBI For Access to FacialRecognition Records (June 26, 2013), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-sues-fbi-access-facialrecognition-records [https://perma.cc/U3HR-RA2K].
236. See Kade Crockford, The FBI Is Tracking Our Faces in Secret. We’re Suing., ACLU (Oct.
31, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/the-fbi-is-tracking-our-faces-in-secret-weresuing/ [https://perma.cc/H4VR-QUWE].
237. Verified Petition, Surveillance Tech. Oversight Project v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No.
150127/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 2020), NYSCEF No. 1.
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emanated from Broken Windows. In the digital context, secret searches are not
uncommon. Some searches are secret by virtue of the application of complex
statutory schemes that keep them out of view; other searches remain secret for
mundane administrative reasons. And, when asked to review sealing orders, gag
orders, and other secrecy mechanisms related to digital searches, courts have
often avoided resolving hard questions about whether secrecy is justified, despite
the implications for search and seizure law itself.
Digital search warrants and surveillance orders are often accompanied by a
complex web of nondisclosure requirements, prosecutorial practices, and local
court rules that prevent public docketing. 238 For example, numerous federal
district courts have established local rules establishing a presumption of secrecy
for digital search warrants and surveillance applications and orders. 239
Law enforcement may also keep searches secret in less formal ways. For
instance, the government may engage in “parallel construction” to keep searches
from coming to light through “laundering the information in question by
concocting independent sources through field interviews, confidential
informants, physical searches and seizures, etc.” 240 As Human Rights Watch
(HRW) has put it, parallel construction allows the government to “creat[e]
fictions to keep potentially questionable investigative activities out of sight.” 241
In 2013, Reuters reported that the DEA was collecting and distributing telephone
records for investigative purposes without disclosing the practice. Instead, DEA
agents used “normal investigative techniques to recreate the information.” 242
HRW reports that the practice of parallel construction has a long pedigree: as

238. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 15, at 162; see also Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the
Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 177, 214–15 (2009) (arguing that
transparency in the courts “is the sine qua non of the common-law tradition”); Smith, supra note 15, at
313 (noting dockets presided over by federal magistrate judges “handles tens of thousands of secret
cases every year,” most of them being “warrant-type applications”).
239. See, e.g., D.D.C. LCrR 49(e) (requiring that applications for electronic surveillance be filed
under seal, but not requiring a motion to seal).
240. Fairfield & Luna, supra note 192, at 1042.
241. HUM. RTS. WATCH, DARK SIDE: SECRET ORIGINS OF EVIDENCE IN US CRIMINAL CASES 2
(2018), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0118.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VXJ-28GA].
242. John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. Directs Agents to Cover Up Program
Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dea-sodidUSBRE97409R20130805 [https://perma.cc/HJV8-E4QP]. Certain types of foreign intelligence
surveillance are often kept secret as well. For example, Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act
authorizes the government to target and collect the communications of non-United States persons
outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. Many of these programs
only came to light because NSA contractor Edward Snowden exposed them. See, e.g., Barton Gellman,
Julie Tate & Ashkan Soltani, In NSA-Intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber the
Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-whoare/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
[https://perma.cc/CM2P7KDP]. The secrecy issues related to national security surveillance can, and have, filled volumes. See,
e.g., supra notes 40–41; Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY
L.J. 1313 (2016).
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early as 1976, intelligence agencies considered how they could avoid disclosing
classified intelligence to criminal defendants in court cases. 243
The central role of communications service providers in disclosing user
data upon government request also impedes transparency by allowing law
enforcement to avoid notifying users about searches of communications records.
Most warrants and court orders to compel the disclosure of user information are
directed at communications intermediaries. 244 Under Section 2703 of the Stored
Communications Act (SCA), law enforcement can seek a search warrant directed
at the communications service provider to obtain the contents of a user’s online
communications, such as their emails. 245 Unlike the ordinary search warrant
framework, however, the SCA does not require law enforcement to notify the
target of an SCA search warrant. 246 In other words, it is up to the service provider
to decide whether to notify its customers that law enforcement has searched their
emails. 247 Indeed, numerous lower courts have agreed that providing notice to
the service provider satisfies the government’s notice obligations under the
SCA. 248
But the service providers who receive search warrants for their customers’
information often are forbidden to notify the targets of searches. Section 2705(b)
of the SCA permits the government to seek a court order commanding the service
provider not to notify the target of a search. 249
The result puts communications intermediaries in a distinctively powerful
position to either facilitate or impede public knowledge about surveillance. 250
Tech companies have sometimes mounted successful public campaigns to
address surveillance secrecy. In 2016, Microsoft filed a complaint in federal
district court alleging that over a period of eighteen months, it had received
almost 2,600 secrecy orders preventing it from notifying its customers that the

243. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 241, at 15.
244. See generally Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99
(2018) (discussing the role of companies like Apple, Google, and Facebook in government surveillance).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
246. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
247. See, e.g., EXEC. OFF. FOR U. S. ATT’YS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 135 (2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JC9Z-KTF5].
248. See, e.g., In re Application of the U. S. for a Search Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail, 665
F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221–22 (D. Or. 2009) (concluding that, “when the property to be seized is in the
possession of a third party,” the Stored Communications Act and Fourth Amendment require only notice
to the third party); Application for Warrant for Email Acct. [redacted]@gmail.com, No. 10-291-M-01
(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2010) (order granting warrant), https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/mag10291.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HMM-W3DP].
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (setting out requirements for separate nondisclosure order).
250. See Rozenshtein, supra note 244; Jonathan Manes, Online Service Providers and
Surveillance Law Transparency, 125 YALE L.J.F. 343, 345 (2016) (noting that, given the informational
dynamics of compelled disclosure, tech companies are uniquely able to articulate “how the government
has construed its surveillance authority”).
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government had searched their records. 251 Microsoft argued that the secret
searches of its users’ emails violated their Fourth Amendment rights by evading
the constitutionally required notice to the target of a search. 252 But the court ruled
that Microsoft lacked standing to advance a Fourth Amendment claim on behalf
of its users. 253 As a result, the court could not consider the company’s argument
that the secrecy of digital searches made them unreasonable. 254 At the same time,
Microsoft successfully argued that expansive gag orders infringe their First
Amendment rights. 255 Although Microsoft heralded this victory against secrecy
requirements, critics have cast doubt on firms’ motivations for challenging
secrecy orders and surveillance practices, noting that in the majority of cases,
platforms appear to acquiesce to law enforcement demands. 256
The broader ecology of secrecy has also prompted others to deploy
transparency law to unveil digital surveillance practices. A Seattle-based news
organization, The Stranger, filed a petition to unseal a secret digital surveillance
docket, arguing that the systemic opacity violated the public’s First Amendment
right of access to government proceedings. 257 The Stranger explicitly linked the
interest in transparency to the fact that the government can often use digital
surveillance without probable cause, contending that the lower evidentiary
threshold made the public interest more pronounced. 258 While the Federal
Prosecutor’s Office opposed the petition, it acknowledged the court’s power to
adopt changes to its docketing practices and expressed support for a coordinated
process to assess the impact of new unsealing procedures. 259 After mediation,
the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the Court Clerk developed new procedures
that would make the docket far more transparent, and The Stranger agreed to

251. Complaint ¶ 5, Microsoft Corp. v. U. S. Dep’t of Just., 233 F. Supp. 3d 887 (W.D. Wash.
2017) (No. 2:16-cv-00538), ECF No. 1.
252. Id. ¶¶ 31–37.
253. Microsoft Corp., 233 F. Supp. 3d at 915.
254. Id. at 916 (acknowledging that “some of Microsoft’s customers will be practically unable to
vindicate their own Fourth Amendment rights” because electronic searches proceed behind a “veil of
secrecy”).
255. Microsoft’s First Amendment claims survived the motion to dismiss. See id. at 911–12.
Microsoft ultimately settled with the Department of Justice after it adopted a new administrative policy
requiring each secrecy order to have “an appropriate factual basis” and presuming that, “[b]arring
exceptional circumstances,” a secrecy order should last no longer than one year. Memorandum from
Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Heads of Dep’t L. Enf’t Components,
Dep’t Litig. Components, Dir., Exec. Off. U.S. Att’ys & All U.S. Att’ys (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/1005791/download [https://perma.cc/4VLZ-CXSE].
See generally Aviv S. Halpern, Note, Secret Searches: The SCA’s Standing Conundrum, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 1697 (2019) (arguing the SCA and nondisclosure orders create procedural due violations and
Fourth Amendment violations).
256. COHEN, supra note 15, at 133.
257. Petition at 1, In re Petition of Index Newspapers LLC to Unseal Elec. Surveillance Dockets,
2:17-mc-00145 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2017), ECF No. 1.
258. Id. at 23.
259. Response to Petition at 5, In re Pet. of Index Newspapers LLC, 2:17-mc-00145 (Mar. 13,
2018), ECF No. 14.
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dismiss the case. 260 Journalists and advocates have employed similar approaches
in California, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere to seek access to information
about digital surveillance practices. 261
IV.
POLICING, SECRECY, AND DEMOCRACY
This Section explains both the positive aspects and potential drawbacks of
relying on transparency’s “shadow docket” to advance law enforcement
accountability. Even if not explicitly, the literature on procedural justice,
democratic policing, and community policing rests on a set of assumptions about
the value of transparency in promoting public trust, accountability, and
compliance with the law. Whether transparency litigation is an effective way of
achieving those interests remains to be seen, however.
A. Broadening the Range of Potential Litigants
Many of the cases outlined in the previous Section produced important
records and documents about policing that have generated substantive change,
stimulated oversight efforts, prompted public discussion, and motivated
additional advocacy. When courts ordered the NYPD to disclose records about
SQF and the Trespass Affidavit Program in New York City, the information
therein formed the basis of successful class action lawsuits. 262 When Microsoft
challenged the federal government’s widespread use of gag orders to obscure
digital searches, it extracted a settlement that restricted the use of secrecy
orders. 263
The law of access to government records and proceedings can further
incentivize civil society organizations, movement groups, and individuals to
bring lawsuits to expose practices and policies that might otherwise go
unchallenged. 264 FOIA, for example, permits “any person” to file a request for

260. Aaron Mackey, Victory: Federal Court in Seattle Will Begin Disclosing Surveillance
Records, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/01/victoryfederal-court-seattle-will-begin-disclosing-surveillance-records [https://perma.cc/WV5K-VES4].
261. See In re Granick, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that the First
Amendment right of access does not extend to materials and dockets related to search warrants, wiretaps,
SCA orders, pen registers, and the All Writs Act); In re Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance
Applications & Orders, 964 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 18-5276); see also Naomi Gilens, New
Justice Department Documents Show Huge Increase in Warrantless Electronic Surveillance, ACLU
(Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/new-justicedepartment-documents-show-huge-increase [https://perma.cc/Y66C-L32M] (documenting results of a
FOIA lawsuit).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 170–173.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 251–256.
264. These features of transparency litigation can help alleviate burdens on poor and underresourced individuals who are directly affected by the decisions they seek to challenge. See BlochWehba, supra note 213, at 1269.
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government records—and a lawsuit compelling their disclosure. 265 This
statutory structure was intended to promote newsgathering, making it easier for
journalists and news organizations to gain access to information critical for
informed public participation. 266 FOIA’s fee-shifting provision, which awards
attorneys’ fees to FOIA requesters who prevail in court, was likewise intended
to ensure that the “average citizen can take advantage of the law to the same
extent as the giant corporations with large legal staffs.” 267 Several states, though
by no means all, have adopted similar fee-shifting provisions in state public
records acts. 268 Similarly, the courts have repeatedly held that any member of
the press or public may advance the First Amendment right of access to
government proceedings because secrecy impinges upon the First Amendment’s
“structural role . . . in securing and fostering our republican system of selfgovernment.” 269
At least in theory, the fact that anyone can seek access to government
records through FOIA or the First Amendment improves the likelihood that the
public will learn about secret police programs and surveillance techniques. This
is particularly important because secretive and surreptitious policing techniques
evade application of the exclusionary rule and thus leave many substantial
questions about the constitutionality of surveillance unanswered. 270 Because the
rules on notice are unclear at best, it seems possible that many individuals are
arrested on the basis of evidence that is never disclosed to them. 271 As
Georgetown’s Clare Garvie noted in the context of facial recognition, law
enforcement typically considers identifications produced by a facial recognition
system to be “investigative leads,” and they rarely disclose information about the
role of facial recognition to defendants. 272

265. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D); see also Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra note 21, at 1103–
04 (describing statutory scheme).
266. Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1371 (2016).
267. H.R. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS & SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG.,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93–502) 170 (Joint Comm. Print
1975), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/FOIA-1974.pdf [http://perma.cc/X2XW-9B4K].
268. See Heath Hooper & Charles N. Davis, A Tiger with No Teeth: The Case for Fee Shifting in
State Public Records Law, 79 MO. L. REV. 949, 959–60 (2014).
269. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
270. See Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2015) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment does not generally cover big data systems designed to execute day-to-day bureaucratized
surveillance.”).
271. See, e.g., RASHIDA RICHARDSON, JASON M. SCHULTZ & VINCENT M. SOUTHERLAND, AI
NOW, LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT: NEW CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT USE OF
ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 13–15 (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019us.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W7G-FLSA] (describing the intersection between prosecutors’ obligations to
disclose material exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland and the emergence of algorithmic
systems to generate evidence).
272. CLARE GARVIE, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV & TECH., GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT: FACE
RECOGNITION ON FLAWED DATA § 3 (2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com/#results
[https://perma.cc/D78W-UPME].
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But despite their promise, efforts to shed light on records concerning
surveillance and policing can also be frustratingly slow. It has been over two
years since ProPublica first gained access to de-identified data from Chicago’s
gang database. 273 Since that time, the city’s Inspector General has issued a
damning report about the database, and Lori Lightfoot included a promise to
replace the database with a better and more limited alternative in her successful
mayoral campaign. 274
Even though any individual is theoretically able to bring an open records
lawsuit, a relatively small number of civil society organizations with in-house
interests and expertise in transparency litigation have remained primarily
responsible for advancing the shadow docket. Unsurprisingly, some of these
organizations, such as the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, share
interests in transparency and in the substantive privacy issues implicated by
policing. 275 Increasingly, movement groups such as Mijente, Organized
Communities Against Deportation, Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, Communities
United for Police Reform, and others are also organizing around law
enforcement accountability issues and simultaneously advancing transparency as
a chief prong of their strategy. 276 Yet while organizations like Legal Aid Society
and Erase the Database are pioneering grassroots open records initiatives to
address secretive policing practices, the reality is that established civil liberties
organizations are dominating the shadow docket. The outsized presence of wellfunded civil liberties organizations might therefore cast some doubt on whether
open government strategies are truly empowering activists and movement

273. See Dumke, supra note 200.
274. Heather Cherone, Follow-Up Audit of CPD’s Gang Database Almost Complete. City
Council Has Yet to Examine Original Findings, WTTW NEWS (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://news.wttw.com/2020/08/24/follow-audit-cpd-s-gang-database-almost-complete-city-councilhas-yet-examine-original [https://perma.cc/5P49-Q2LR]; LORI LIGHTFOOT FOR CHI., A STRATEGY FOR
PUBLIC SAFETY IN EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD 10 (2019), https://lightfootforchicago.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/LL-Position-paper_StrategyPublicSafety.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MYX3A7F5].
275. See About the ACLU’s Project on Speech, Privacy, and Technology, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/about-aclus-project-speech-privacy-and-technology
[https://perma.cc/9X78-9SN8] (articulating dedication to freedom of expression and privacy rights);
About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://eff.org/about [https://perma.cc/8GBV-9A3R]
(articulating dedication to “user privacy, free expression, and innovation”).
276. See discussion supra Part III.B.1; see also STOP LAPD SPYING COAL.,
https://stoplapdspying.org/ [https://perma.cc/8TXX-43AW]; CMTYS. UNITED FOR POLICE REFORM,
https://www.changethenypd.org/ [https://perma.cc/VWH2-5G64] (calling for passage of the Safer NY
Act to enhance transparency and accountability); MOVEMENT 4 BLACK LIVES, DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNITY CONTROL OF LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, ENSURING
THAT COMMUNITIES MOST HARMED BY DESTRUCTIVE POLICING HAVE THE POWER TO HIRE AND
FIRE OFFICERS, DETERMINE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, CONTROL BUDGETS AND POLICIES, AND
SUBPOENA
RELEVANT
AGENCY
INFORMATION,
https://m4bl.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/CommControlofLawEnforcement-OnePager.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LDAYQKK] (identifying need for civilian oversight to eliminate “roadblocks to law enforcement
transparency and accountability”).
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organizations or whether they chiefly reflect the priorities of non-profit
organizations.
Moreover, critics of the “freedom of information” framework have
observed that open government’s “entitlement” of access to government records
has unintended negative effects. Predictably, the flood of requests leads to
significant delays and to de facto denials that only requesters with means and
access to representation can afford to challenge. 277 As a result, news media and
civil society organizations represent a relative minority of requesters and FOIA
litigants, while commercial requesters clog the system with requests for records
that financially benefit them. 278 Though these drawbacks reflect systemic
inequities in the open government framework, they are less apparent in the
context of policing, where commercial interests are less prevalent (although, of
course, still present).
Relying on FOIA and open government to reveal secretive policing
practices might also backfire, undermining transparency interests by prompting
law enforcement to be less candid. 279 Open government obligations might thus
undermine, rather than advance, law enforcement transparency. In fact, David
Pozen contended that the open government framework serves largely to
“legitimate the lion’s share of government secrecy while delegitimating and
debilitating government itself.” 280
These critiques sound a cautionary note about the wholehearted embrace of
open government norms. On the one hand, experience suggests that law
enforcement imperatives will often inevitably trump even the best-designed
transparency mandates. On the other hand, the architecture of open government
itself might prove unhelpful, or even counterproductive, in trying to promote
good governance values.
These dynamics are perhaps less concerning in the context of law
enforcement accountability than elsewhere. The combination of judicial
deference to law enforcement, lack of notice to defendants, and absence of
legislative or other independent oversight mechanisms in both settings already
fosters a lack of candor by police. 281 Policing also has a tendency to rely on
277. See Kwoka, supra note 266, at 1424 (“The sheer volume of commercial requests at some
agencies is by definition taxing the system, and can only be making the barriers to the use of FOIA for
democracy-enhancing activities all the higher.”); see also Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra note
21, at 1116–17.
278. See Kwoka, supra note 266, at 1380 (noting that, at the four largest FOIA offices researched,
commercial requesters “represent[ed] the overwhelming majority” of all requests).
279. See generally Andrew Keane Woods, The Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2018)
(arguing that excess transparency may act as “a kind of tax on the legal system”).
280. Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra note 21, at 1100.
281. The courts tend to be highly deferential to executive branch claims of secrecy in national
security cases, even outside the context of formal executive privilege or state secrets privilege claims.
See Kitrosser, supra note 32, at 504 (describing “nearly insurmountable deference in the realm of
national security, as represented by the national security aspect of the Nixon Court’s reasoning”);
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“secret law”: though internal rules and policies provide key information about
the law itself, they are concealed as a government secret, depriving the public
and the legislature of the ability to scrutinize these rules. 282 Secret law raises
particularly potent questions about political checkability because it has proven
to be resistant to oversight by the lawmaking branch. 283
Alternative mechanisms might produce better outcomes for criminal
defendants, government agencies, and the public. For example, affirmative
disclosure of government records might be preferable to the reactive model
embraced by FOIA, and legislative monitoring could fulfill much of FOIA’s
oversight function without its ideological costs. 284 Affirmative obligations to
disclose records of certain categories on an ongoing, regular basis at time
intervals defined by statute could undoubtedly help oversight institutions, the
public, and civil society organizations to better understand the contours of
policing practice. Yet police agencies maintain virtually uncontested control over
all of the information relevant to these priorities and to informed decisionmaking and policy-making. 285
At the same time, police departments may not regularly disclose
information even if they are required to do so. For example, NYPD has resisted
disclosing data about SQF and fare evasion arrests even after the New York City
Council required the agency to publicize the information. 286 The political
realities highlight the need for any alternative or supplement to the open records
system to be carefully designed with meaningful remedies.
B. Visibility, Trust, and Legitimacy
Public trust in police is a paramount value within criminal justice reform
efforts and scholarship. 287 To the extent that scholars and advocates have
considered transparency law as an aspect of criminal justice reform at all, the
thinking has often reflected a core assumption that transparency breeds good

Samaha, supra note 42, at 935 (“Judicial perception of institutional need supports secrecy beyond claims
of executive privilege.”). Similar dynamics pervade ordinary law enforcement cases. See Lvovsky,
supra note 57; Barry Friedman, Why Do Courts Defer to Cops?, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 323 (2017);
Kwoka, supra note 57, at 216–17 (describing express judicial deference to law enforcement interests in
FOIA cases).
282. Manes, supra note 42; Hafetz, supra note 42; Rudesill, supra note 42.
283. Manes, supra note 42, at 822–23.
284. See Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra note 21, at 1107–08.
285. See, e.g., Gwynne Hogan, NYPD Won’t Release Arrest Info on Turnstile Jumping, MTA
Board Member Says, DNAINFO (May 22, 2017), https://www.dnainfo.com/newyork/20170522/financial-district/mta-subway-fair-fares-swipe-it-forward-police-nypd
[https://perma.cc/JA33-VUQB]; see also Samuel Walker, Science and Politics in Police Research:
Reflections on Their Tangled Relationship, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 137 (2004).
286. See supra at Part III.A.
287. See Bell, supra note 137, at 2058–59 (describing the frequent conflation of trust and
legitimacy).
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governance. 288 For instance, the 2015 report from the President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing recommended that police agencies should adopt
procedural justice and transparency reforms in service of promoting public trust
and legitimacy. 289 With regard to transparency, the Task Force recommended
that law enforcement publish their policies, aggregate data about policing, and
communicate with the public. 290 Police chiefs across the nation likewise
emphasize transparency as a key aspect of public trust. 291
But transparency alone does not inexorably breed trust and legitimacy. 292
The procedural justice model, for example, stresses how compliance with the
law is “powerfully influenced by people’s subjective judgments about the
fairness of the procedures” that the police abide by when engaging with
civilians. 293 At its core, procedural justice insists upon police ability to convey
that they make decisions in “neutral, objective, consistent ways.” 294
The concept of visibility plays an underappreciated role in facilitating the
goals of procedural justice. For the public to consider law enforcement
legitimate, and for police to secure compliance with the law, decision-makers
need both to “be fair and to be seen as being fair.” 295 In other words, it’s not
enough for police to abide by rules and procedures that are fair yet opaque. To
promote the ultimate goal of legal compliance, procedural justice requires not
only empirically fair procedures—a proposition that police could demonstrate
by making their procedures public, transparent, and participatory—but also the
public perception of fairness. 296
288. Although the classic statement of this principle—“Sunlight is . . . the best of
disinfectants”—belongs to Justice Brandeis, “hundreds of law review articles” borrow from his
articulation. Fenster, supra note 46, at 620 n.7, 626 & n.28.
289. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S
TASK
FORCE
ON
21ST
CENTURY
POLICING
1
(2015),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/75DX-KUHX].
290. Id. at 13; see also id. at 21 (describing how policies requiring independent prosecutors in
police-use-of-force cases “demonstrate the transparency to the public that can lead to mutual trust
between community and law enforcement”).
291. See POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., ADVICE FROM POLICE CHIEFS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS ON
BUILDING TRUST: “ASK FOR HELP, WORK TOGETHER, AND SHOW RESPECT,” (2016),
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/policecommunitytrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/3545-TVQX].
292. Cf. Bell, supra note 137, at 2081–82 (noting that many policymakers view procedural justice
as “relatively easy for police agencies to implement, relatively inexpensive, and relatively
noncontroversial,” and that without a concomitant focus on the problem of “estrangement,” these
reforms are unlikely to succeed).
293. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 283, 284 (2003). Procedural justice is the subject of an immense literature that considers many
decision-making contexts beyond policing. See Nancy A. Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement, and
Procedural Justice, 16 NEV. L.J. 983, 1023 (2016) (outlining social science research that demonstrates
that perceptions of fair process affect perceptions of fair outcomes, compliance, and legitimacy).
294. Tyler, supra note 293, at 334.
295. Meares & Tyler, supra note 59, at 535 (“Many judges devote their attention to being fair,
i.e., to correctly applying the law to the facts of each case, but do not think about how they can
communicate that they are being fair to the parties in the case or to the public more generally.”).
296. Id. at 542.
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Democratic policing takes a slightly different tack, suggesting that the root
of police dysfunction is not its opacity or unfairness as such but rather its
distanced relationship with ordinary democratic oversight mechanisms. 297
According to this diagnosis, “virtually none” of the administrative law
mechanisms designed to hold the executive branch in check—including
transparency obligations—apply to police. 298 Advocates of democratic policing
and other like-minded reformers propose an analogy between law enforcement
agencies and other executive branch agencies. 299 By emphasizing the role of
lawmaking and public participation in legitimating policing, democratic policing
scholarship argues for redistributing the authority to oversee police to a broader
set of actors and thus for recentering the public as the ultimate source of police
power. 300
Both of these approaches recognize that, without deeper commitments to
building trust and more enduring systems for oversight and democratic control,
transparency will not legitimate police authority. But an absence of visibility also
exacerbates mistrust: opacity is looked on with suspicion. 301
Although proponents of transparency litigation often argue that exposing
policing practices will advance trust, there may be reason to doubt this
assumption. 302 Critics have called transparency “overvalued.” 303 For one thing,
the claim that transparency produces social trust or other desirable outcomes has
not been the subject of much rigorous empirical examination. 304 Indeed, one
meta-analysis found that transparency’s relationship to trust is inconsistent at
297. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1.
298. Id. at 1843.
299. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1; Renan, supra note 57; Christopher
Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (2016).
300. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 1, at 1886–89 (describing different models
for community engagement, including commissions, oversight boards, and notice-and-comment
rulemaking); cf. Kitrosser, supra note 1, at 1173–74 (describing how the legislative process is engineered
for transparency while the executive branch is designed to facilitate secrecy).
301. Cf. Fenster, supra note 21, at 931 (“When significant segments of the public believe that
corruption or conspiracy permeate government, their desire for transparency becomes obsessive and
their ability to rationally sort and interpret information suffers as a result.”); Malte Ziewitz, Governing
Algorithms: Myth, Mess, and Methods, 41 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 3, 6 (2016) (“[O]pacity of
operation tends to be read as another sign of influence and power.”)
302. See, e.g., Intervenors Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Intervention and for
Access to Court Documents at 17, People v. Van Dyke, 17-cr-0428601 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/litigation/Van%20Dyke_2018-0306_intervenors_memorandum_of_law_in_support.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9DK-5WCW] (“Public
scrutiny over the court system promotes community respect for the rule of law, provides a check on the
activities of judges and litigants, and fosters more accurate fact finding.” (quoting A.P. v. M.E.E., 354
Ill. App. 3d 989, 999 (1st Dist. 2004))); see also supra Part III.C.1 (describing invocation of trust in the
context of The Stranger’s effort to unseal electronic surveillance records).
303. Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389 (2010); see
also Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 21, at 100–01 (documenting how open data mandates have
come at the expense of government’s ability to function); Samaha, supra note 42, at 922 (observing
some of the costs of “transparency”).
304. Etzioni, supra note 303, at 394–95 (noting the dearth of empirical evidence).
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best and inverse at worst. 305 For another, several examples suggest that, in order
to promote “accountability and responsiveness” in government, transparency
must be paired with other avenues of public engagement. 306
Perhaps the rise of the shadow docket might be interpreted, rather than
advancing trust, as giving voice to communities and movements that distrust
police. 307 As Monica Bell has put it, when it comes to police, “many poor
African Americans might see police as a legitimate authority in the ideal, and
might even empathize with some police officers’ plight, but they find the police
as a whole too corrupt, unpredictable, or biased to deem them trustworthy.” 308
But the transactional frame of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which focuses
on individuals’ rights and the remedy of suppressing the fruits of unlawful
searches and seizures, fails to truly reflect what Bell calls “legal estrangement.”
Instead, as she notes, policing cases “send messages to groups about social
inclusion and, indeed, social citizenship.” 309
Transparency litigation, like other civil litigation strategies, might thus
reflect a conscious effort to dismantle, contest, and resist law enforcement
institutions rather than to support their trustworthiness or legitimacy. This strain
of advocacy, scholarship, and critique—what some have called “radical,”
“progressive” or “left”—aims not to legitimate police authority but to utterly
reconstruct the relationship between police and communities. 310 The task of
empowering the public—in particular, the public most affected by law
enforcement and mass incarceration—is central to this project. 311
And while one might be faulted for believing that transparency alone could
give rise to meaningful accountability or reform, the emergence of the shadow
docket illustrates a conviction that transparency litigation can spur “both popular
and legislative scrutiny.” 312 To the extent transparency deflates other efforts to
encourage regulation or public participation—even if temporarily—it may be
counterproductive. 313 But in the efforts outlined above, transparency litigation—
sometimes brought by legislative actors themselves or in tandem with legislative
strategies—tends not to exhaust the potential for public engagement but rather
to aid it. Indeed, in light of the informational dynamics of modern policing, it is

305. Gregory A. Porumbescu, Using Transparency to Enhance Responsiveness and Trust in
Local Government: Can It Work?, 47 STATE & LOC. GOV’T REV. 205, 210 (2015).
306. Id. at 208.
307. Bell, supra note 137, at 2086–87.
308. Id. at 2087.
309. See id. at 2140–42 (“Judges who rule on the constitutionality of searches should keep in
mind the stakes of giving too much leeway to the police.”).
310. See, e.g., id.; Akbar, supra note 22; Simonson, supra note 23.
311. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778
(2021).
312. Pozen, Freedom of Information, supra note 21, at 1111.
313. See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 303, at 390 (“[I]deological advocates of transparency maintain
that it can obviate the need for most—if not all—government controls.”).
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difficult to imagine an effective regulatory strategy that operates without a degree
of information-forcing.
C. The Transparency Two-Step
Perhaps the most significant drawback of the shadow docket is that it is a
deeply flawed mechanism for actually reining in policing. Transparency
litigation, like the law itself, is a tool. 314 But it is not clear that it’s the right
tool. 315
These cases are not about transparency for transparency’s sake, and
transparency does not provide an adequate substitute for more robust and
meaningful accountability obligations. Movements, individuals, and civil society
organizations have turned to transparency law not because it is superior at
accomplishing police accountability but because, given the constraints of politics
and constitutional doctrine, it is the only viable option to get the foot in the
courthouse door. 316 Often, as the foregoing analysis underscores, litigants deploy
transparency law to establish a foundation for further reform or accountability.
Transparency litigation is thus an initial step on the pathway to substantive
reform. If this diagnosis is accurate to any significant degree, it should prompt
us not to embrace transparency as a standalone cure for what ails law
enforcement, but to recommit to broadening the avenues for police
accountability.
Consider the story of police cameras. On October 20, 2014, Chicago police
officer Jason Van Dyke shot and killed teenager Laquan McDonald. 317 Van
Dyke and several other law enforcement officers had responded to a call
reporting an individual breaking into cars. 318 According to official accounts, the
officers had used their squad cars to box in the seventeen-year-old suspect, who
was carrying a knife in one hand. 319 A police union spokesman told the Chicago
Sun-Times, “An officer shot him in the chest when he refused to comply with
orders to drop the knife and continued to approach the officers.” 320 Soon
afterwards, a whistleblower approached Craig Futterman, a law professor at the
University of Chicago, and Jamie Kalven, an independent journalist, and told
314. Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (2018)
(“Tools should be used to accomplish normatively desirable tasks when they are an efficient way of
accomplishing or facilitating that task. Following that logic, tools should not be used when the task itself
is inappropriate or when the tool is ill-suited for the job at hand.”).
315. See supra Part IV.A–B (articulating critiques of transparency litigation).
316. For example, the Ligon plaintiffs would not have been satisfied if NYPD had simply
disclosed records about Operation Clean Halls, but had not ended the program. See supra text
accompanying notes 170–173.
317. Mary Mitchell, Questions Surround a Chicago Police Fatal Shooting of a Teen, CHI. SUNTIMES (June 24, 2016) https://chicago.suntimes.com/2016/6/24/18448853/questions-surround-achicago-police-fatal-shooting-of-a-teen [https://perma.cc/AH82-RUYN].
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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them that McDonald had been retreating, not advancing; that a White male
officer had shot McDonald as he was backing away; that the officer had “fired
repeatedly into his body”; and that the CPD was not investigating the murder. 321
Public outrage and a “pitched legal battle doggedly pursued by local
investigative journalists” ensued. 322 Kalven filed a FOIA request for the autopsy
report, which showed that McDonald had been shot sixteen times. 323 The next
month, Chicago’s city council approved a $5 million settlement to McDonald’s
family, on the condition that the family not release the footage from the
dashboard camera that recorded the murder. 324 The nondisclosure provision
prompted public outrage, and in April, Alderman Howard Brookins called on the
CPD to release the footage from the dashboard camera that recorded the
murder. 325 In May 2015, freelance journalist Brandon Smith filed a FOIA
request for the dashcam video. 326 And in November, only hours after Van Dyke
was charged with first-degree murder, the video was released to the public,
showing Van Dyke opening fire six seconds after getting out of his squad car as
McDonald was walking away. 327
The story of Laquan McDonald is not a righteous story about the power of
government transparency to expose wrongdoing and promote accountability.
321. Craig Futterman & Jamie Kalven, Laquan McDonald, INVISIBLE INST. (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://invisible.institute/news/2014/laquan-mcdonald [https://perma.cc/E64D-MACM]; Curtis Black,
How Chicago Tried to Cover up a Police Execution, CHI. REP. (Nov. 24, 2015),
https://www.chicagoreporter.com/how-chicago-tried-to-cover-up-a-police-execution/
[https://perma.cc/54FX-QER3].
322. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING
TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 3 (2016),
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z6TY-ZFS4]; see also Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Five Years Later, Do Black Lives
Matter?, JACOBIN MAG. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://jacobinmag.com/2019/09/black-lives-matter-laquanmcdonald-mike-brown-eric-garner [https://perma.cc/3X6U-QV4B] (noting the formative and essential
role of Black organizing in producing the Task Force’s report at all).
323. Jamie Kalven, Sixteen Shots, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2015), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2015/02/laquan-mcdonald-shooting-a-recently-obtained-autopsy-report-on-the-dead-teencomplicates-the-chicago-police-departments-story.html [https://perma.cc/9A9V-WUBL].
324. Mary Mitchell, Why the City Doesn’t Want Video of Laquan McDonald’s Shooting
Released, CHI. SUN-TIMES (June 24, 2016), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2016/6/24/18479492/whythe-city-doesn-t-want-video-of-laquan-mcdonald-s-shooting-released
[https://perma.cc/W9E4XJWD].
325. See, e.g., Fran Spielman, Alderman Demands Release of Video of Police Officer Shooting
Black
Teenager,
CHI.
SUN-TIMES
(Apr.
14,
2015),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/2015/4/14/18377011/alderman-demands-release-of-video-of-policeofficer-shooting-black-teenager [https://perma.cc/GQP4-545U]
326. Jeremy Borden, How a Little-Known, Uber-Driving Freelancer Brought the Lawsuit That
Forced Chicago to Release a Police Shooting Video, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/brandon_smith_chicago_police_laquan_mcdonald.php
[https://perma.cc/5DFF-84CL].
327. Jason Meisner, Jeremy Gorner & Steve Schmadeke, Chicago Releases Dash-cam Video of
Fatal Shooting After Cop Charged with Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2015),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-chicago-cop-shooting-video-laquan-mcdonaldcharges-20151124-story.html [https://perma.cc/S5YU-BSUU].
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Rather, Laquan McDonald’s tragic and untimely death exposed how deep
pathologies within CPD narrowed the opportunities to hold Van Dyke
accountable and thus compelled advocates to turn to transparency law to expose
the wrongdoing. In their initial blog post, Kalven and Futterman expressed
exhaustion with the endless repetition of a cycle of impunity. “A black man is
shot by a Chicago police officer. Police sources at the scene say the shooting was
justified. The Independent Police Review Authority says it is investigating the
incident. Then silence.” 328 Only if the truth would come out, they seemed to say,
would accountability be possible.
Systemic reform has followed from the McDonald shooting to address both
the racist police violence in Chicago and the police culture of secrecy that
embraced coverups and other attempts to conceal widespread wrongdoing. The
State of Illinois sued the Chicago Police Department for a pattern and practice
of using excessive force in Black and Latinx communities in Chicago. 329 The
state pointed out that the CPD exhibited a disproportionately high use of force
against African-American and Latinx people, and that its Independent Police
Review Authority sustained a disproportionately low percentage of misconduct
complaints—only 2 percent. 330 In 2016, reformer Kim Foxx was elected as the
State’s Attorney for Cook County. 331 In 2019, a federal court approved a historic
consent decree to reform the Chicago Police Department. 332
Those reforms undoubtedly flowed from the public outrage over
McDonald’s murder. But they also illustrate that the correct response to abuses
of police authority is not to rely on transparency as a remedy, but rather to use
all the tools at our disposal to dismantle and reconstruct law enforcement:
litigation, regulation, legislation, law reform, and “non-law” mechanisms
included. 333
V.
TRANSPARENCY REMEDIES
Investigative methods are not at the fringe of what communities are
concerned about with regard to law enforcement: they are the core. SQF, Broken
Windows, and their digital counterparts have prompted pushback from civil
society and social movements not because they are symptomatic of broader

328. Futterman & Kalven, supra note 321.
329. Complaint, Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260, (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2017).
330. Id. ¶¶ 36–39, 130.
331. Miles Kampf-Lassin, Chicago’s Political Revolution, IN THESE TIMES (Feb. 12, 2019),
http://inthesetimes.com/features/chicago_mayor_aldermanic_elections_political_revolution_social_m
ovements.html [https://perma.cc/55JZ-JPX5].
332. FAQ, CHI. POLICE CONSENT DECREE, http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/faq/
[https://perma.cc/M5T3-K7SR].
333. See Harmon, supra note 16, at 789–90 (describing how much “contemporary legal
scholarship on policing does not adequately recognize or foster the project of governing police conduct
through law”).
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distrust and estrangement from police; they are the root cause of distrust and
estrangement. Against this background, it is all the more important for
individuals and organizations to be able to confront these programs, to
understand how they work, and to hold them in check. While transparency
litigation has become an essential tool for movements, advocacy groups, and
journalists alike to address police secrecy, this Section begins to sketch out how
other options might be better suited to more directly promote accountability in
policing.
A. Transparency Outside the Shadow Docket
In Section 1983 actions and in consent decrees with police departments,
courts have been instituting a variety of transparency-oriented reforms to remedy
patterns of unconstitutional police conduct: body cameras, court-appointed
monitoring, town hall meetings, and engagement with civil society and
community organizations. In so doing, courts are working to make policing more
“politically checkable”—both more amenable to oversight and more
democratically legitimate.
These initiatives illustrate that transparency remedies need not be restricted
to transparency litigation. For instance, the dual strategy employed in the SQF
litigation focused on extracting the UF-250 data to demonstrate a pattern of
racially biased policing. But the court-ordered remedies also focused on
transparency beyond the UF-250. Judge Scheindlin ordered the UF-250 to be
revised to include additional fields, including an explanation of the officer’s
basis for reasonable suspicion and the explanation for why a frisk was
performed. 334 The UF-250 also had to include a “tear-off” portion to be given to
“each stopped person at the end of the encounter.” 335 Beyond the UF-250, Judge
Scheindlin also ordered NYPD to conduct a pilot study of body-worn cameras
to determine whether they were effective at deterring unconstitutional SQF
encounters. 336
The district court’s approach to transparency went beyond individual
documentation, however. Noting that community participation was a “vital part
of a sustainable remedy,” Judge Scheindlin ordered the parties to participate in a
joint remedial process for six to nine months that would center on “input from
those who are most affected by the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk.” 337 The court
ordered the Facilitator of the joint remedial process to convene “town hall”
meetings in each borough at which the public could participate. 338 And the
output of that joint remedial process also emphasized the need for “greater
respect, transparency, and accountability” to facilitate public confidence and
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 681–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
Id. at 682.
See id. at 685.
Id. at 686–87.
Id.
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trust in the police. 339 Over NYPD’s objections, the district court also ordered the
appointment of an independent monitor.
The impact of the Floyd remedies opinion is somewhat uncertain,
especially given the “kerfuffle” that ensued when the City appealed and argued
that Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality had been compromised. 340 The point,
however, is that the remedies opinion lays the groundwork for civil remedies
geared toward enhancing public transparency and accountability. The same is
true for consent decrees, which some commentators have suggested play an
important role in promoting community engagement and democratizing the
police. 341 Recognizing the critical role of law enforcement transparency to
political checkability and to the protection of Fourth Amendment rights and
values should spur similar initiatives.
B. Procurement Reform
Constraining law enforcement’s opportunities to procure new police
technologies is another potentially significant avenue for reform. 342 Legislatures
could use the budgeting process to gain leverage in support of police
transparency, requiring police to make certain information available in order to
procure new technologies or pay the vendors who supply them. By monitoring
and placing conditions on police expenditures, institutions can engage in a form
of ex ante oversight that has otherwise been largely fruitless.
An emerging movement for community control of surveillance technology
may provide a template for future legislation. In a model bill, the ACLU suggests
that jurisdictions adopt reforms that require legislative approval for the
acquisition of any new surveillance technology and that law enforcement publish
impact assessments and surveillance use policies prior to adopting a new
technology. 343 Similar laws have passed in Nashville, Seattle, Cambridge, and
elsewhere. 344
339. BELEN, supra note 160, at 11.
340. Emily Chiang, Reviving the Declaratory Judgment: A New Path to Structural Reform, 63
BUFF. L. REV. 549, 604–06 (2015) (explaining the backlash to Judge Scheindlin’s opinion); see also
Anil Kalhan, Stop and Frisk, Judicial Independence, and the Ironies of Improper Appearances, 27 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1043 (2014) (critically assessing the dismissal of Judge Scheindlin).
341. See, e.g., Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community
Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2016); see also
Noah Kupferberg, Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent Decrees, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 129 (2008).
342. See Crump, supra note 1.
343. Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) Model Bill, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/community-control-over-police-surveillance-ccops-model-bill
[https://perma.cc/HKB8-JHVY].
344. Mike Maharrey, Nashville Metro Council Passes Ordinance Taking First Step Toward
Limiting the Surveillance State, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR. BLOG (June 13, 2017),
https://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2017/06/nashville-metro-council-passes-ordinance-takingfirst-step-toward-limiting-the-surveillance-state/ [https://perma.cc/KLF2-MX8E]; Seattle Set to Decide
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Participatory budgeting might promote this principle even more effectively
by engaging a community-centered approach to procurement. Initially developed
by the Workers Party in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in the late 1980s, participatory
budgeting involves unelected citizens in “budgetary decision-making.” 345
Generally implemented on a neighborhood or community-wide basis,
participatory budgeting calls upon residents to determine how to spend a portion
of a city’s budget. 346 In New York City, for instance, a majority of city
councilmembers allocate a portion of their districts’ budgets to be determined by
the community itself. 347 One premise of participatory budgeting is that it may
redirect funds to where the community determines they are most urgently
needed. 348 The Movement for Black Lives, for example, has called for
participatory budgeting processes to “integrate human rights” and prioritize the
needs of poor Black and Brown communities. 349
C. Community Control
In the absence of Fourth Amendment safeguards, it is all the more critical
that alternative institutions might be able to check the police. 350 Those
institutions may include legislative bodies, civilian oversight boards, or
community institutions. Redistributing the authority and power to oversee

on the Fate of 29 Different Surveillance Technologies, MYNORTHWEST (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://mynorthwest.com/1156263/seattle-surveillance-ordinance-public-comment/
[https://perma.cc/53X2-65GL]; Jenna Fisher, Cambridge Passes Law to Regulate Police Surveillance,
PATCH (Dec. 11, 2018), https://patch.com/massachusetts/cambridge/cambridge-passes-law-regulatepolice-surveillance [https://perma.cc/5RDL-S6XN]; Eric Kurhi, Pioneering Spy-Tech Law Adopted by
Santa
Clara
County,
MERCURY
NEWS
(June
7,
2016),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2016/06/07/pioneering-spy-tech-law-adopted-by-santa-clara-county/
[https://perma.cc/H9ZN-PL6R].
345. YVES SINTOMER, ANJA RÖCKE & CARSTEN HERZBERG, PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN
EUROPE: DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 12 (2016).
346. Isaac Jabola-Carolus, Luke Elliott-Negri, James M. Jasper, Jessica Mahlbacher, Manès
Weisskircher & Anna Zhelnina, Strategic Interaction Sequences: The Institutionalization of
Participatory Budgeting in New York City, 19 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 640, 645 (2020); Jennifer
Shkabatur, Cities @ Crossroads: Digital Technology and Local Democracy in America, 76 BROOK. L.
REV. 1413, 1465–71 (2011); Colin Crawford, Our Bandit Future? Cities, Shantytowns, and Climate
Change Governance, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211, 244–46 (2009) (describing participatory budgeting
in Brazil as a partial response to a legacy of authoritarian repression).
347. Thad Calabrese, Dan Williams & Anubhav Gupta, Does Participatory Budgeting Alter
Public Spending? Evidence From New York City, 52 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 1382, 1388–89 (2020) (outlining
New York City’s participatory budgeting structure).
348. Id.at 1385 (“While more money flowed toward poor neighborhoods, the Brazilian
experiment also resulted in public spending reallocated to basic sanitation and health care from other
public functions.”).
349. MOVEMENT 4 BLACK LIVES, PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING AT THE LOCAL, STATE, &
FEDERAL LEVEL, https://m4bl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ParticipatoryBudgeting-OnePager.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PNZ4-BHAW]
350. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED, supra note 95; John Rappaport, Second-Order
Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205 (2015); William Baude & James Y. Stern, The
Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821 (2016).
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policing to a broader set of institutions has the potential to check police
misconduct more effectively, as Rachel Harmon observes. 351
Legislatures in states and cities across the nation have responded to 2020’s
uprising against police violence by taking action intended to limit police abuses
and promote law enforcement transparency. 352 Yet legislative bodies have had
mixed success in exposing police activity, as New York’s Police Reporting Law
and fare evasion reporting law suggest. 353 And where legislatures have acted to
reconsider, reveal, or put an end to unconstitutional police practices, they have
often not been as aggressive as affected communities would like. 354 By
compelling transparency rather than substantive reform, legislatures appear to
hew to the fiction that “Transparency is More Powerful than Regulations.” 355
Community advisory bodies might serve two functions at once, by spurring
more action by city councils and by enhancing the representation of communities
who have historically been excluded from decision-making on policing. ACLU’s
CCOPS model bill, for instance, calls on cities to appoint a community advisory
committee on surveillance that reflects the makeup of the city and that “ensure[s]
communities that have historically been disproportionately subjected to
government surveillance are well-represented.” 356
More “movement-driven” visions have called for community control
mechanisms that “truly shift[] power” to affected communities. 357 The
Movement for Black Lives, for instance, calls for direct community control of
law enforcement, not simply non-binding, advisory input. 358 These calls surface
important and oft-controversial debates about the institutional design of civilian
or community control. 359 For instance, who ought to appoint the members of a

351. Harmon, supra note 16.
352. Kenny Lo, Assessing the State of Police Reform, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 16, 2020),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/news/2020/07/16/487721/assessing-statepolice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/9DRD-VGY2] (summarizing selected state and local reforms);
Legislative Responses for Policing-State Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/legislativeresponses-for-policing.aspx [https://perma.cc/S6XD-2HAN].
353. See supra Part III.A.
354. See, e.g., Cherone, supra note 274 (discussing how Chicago’s city government has failed to
take action on the CLEAR database in spite of calls for hearings and an audit that concluded the database
was deeply flawed).
355. Etzioni, supra note 303, at 390.
356. Community Control Over Police Surveillance (CCOPS) Model Bill, supra note 343.
357. K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control,
108 CALIF. L. REV. 679, 704 (2020).
358. See MOVEMENT 4 BLACK LIVES, supra note 276.
359. See, e.g., Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of
How Civilian Oversight of the Police Should Function and How It Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
1 (2009); Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 151 (2003); Nathan Witkin, The Police-Community Partnership: Civilian Oversight as an
Evaluation Tool for Community Policing, 18 SCHOLAR 181 (2016); Daniel L. Stageman, Nicole M.
Napolitano & Brian Buchner, New Approaches to Data-Driven Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement,
29 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 111 (2018).
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civilian review board, should its recommendations be binding, and ought it have
subpoena authority to investigate allegations of misconduct? 360 Importantly,
battles over civilian control also show that the composition of oversight
institutions matters to police acceptance of and compliance with those mandates.
In other words, police may be so hostile to community-led efforts to control their
behavior that community oversight institutions are even less effective than
legislative bodies. On the other hand, community-led oversight might be more
aggressive than “technocrats” in both seeking access to the information
necessary to understand—and put a stop to—policing strategies that perpetuate
racial inequity. 361
Some have expressed doubts about whether community control is truly the
best remedy for law enforcement. 362 Indeed, even within the movement to
“democratize” law enforcement, there is substantial disagreement about the
proper scope and extent of lay community involvement as opposed to expert-led
policy-making. 363 Resolving these debates is far beyond the scope of this Article.
For now, suffice it to say that the particular design choices made in crafting
community and civilian control mechanisms affect the extent to which those
mechanisms can promote the flow of information to the public.
D. New Expert Oversight Institutions
As law enforcement adopts predictive policing and other programmatic
surveillance methods, the lessons of government secrecy scholarship are
increasingly relevant, perhaps surprisingly so. In a literal sense, cooperation
among state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies blurs the distinctions
between different law enforcement actors, particularly in contexts such as
immigration and national security. 364 The increasing integration of federal, state

360. Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee Police, 46
SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2016) (“[T]hese institutions, which range tremendously in scope and
power, have often times failed to adequately oversee local law enforcement . . . many of these regimes
were rigged to fail in the first place . . . .”); Rahman & Simonson, supra note 357, at 704–06.
361. See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 357, at 704; Stops, Transparency, Oversight and
Protection Act (STOP Act), supra note 29.
362. See John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 711 (2020).
363. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367,
1376 (2017).
364. See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 289 (2012); see also David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration
Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2006); Adam
B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87 (2013); Michael J. Wishnie,
State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004); Abigail
Hauslohner, ICE Provides Local Police a Way to Work Around ‘Sanctuary’ Policies, Act as Immigration
Officers, WASH. POST (May 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/ice-provideslocal-police-a-way-to-work-around-sanctuary-policies-act-as-immigrationofficers/2019/05/06/f651ff38-7029-11e9-9eb4-0828f5389013_story.html
[https://perma.cc/T5CWFN56].
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and local law enforcement priorities, and the turn toward data-driven
investigative methods, help to explain why local and state oversight institutions
have struggled to conduct effective oversight of these activities. As Matthew
Waxman has observed, state and local oversight mechanisms for intelligencegathering or other surreptitious investigative methods are largely
underdeveloped. 365 At the state and local level, few institutions have regulatory
or oversight capacity comparable to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board, federal Inspectors General, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence Civil Liberties Protection Office, or the alphabet soup of other
agencies and offices with some authority to oversee intelligence. 366 Even where
local police have dedicated oversight institutions, such as Inspectors General,
those institutions may have narrow authority or fractious relationships with
police unions. 367
In light of the informational dynamics of modern policing, it is all the more
critical that expert institutions should be empowered to conduct ongoing audits
and monitoring of police surveillance. Some jurisdictions have already
successfully explored these methodologies: recently, a state agency in California
issued a scathing audit report of that state’s gang database, CalGang, and a
similar report in Chicago has spurred a far-reaching conversation about the future
of that city’s gang database. 368
Ex post monitoring and auditing is especially important in the context of
Big Data policing because of concerns about data quality, accuracy, and privacy
issues. 369 Even though auditing may not be able to identify every reason why an
algorithm reaches an impermissible decision—whether it is biased,
discriminatory, or just plain wrong—it remains an important strategy to examine
the “actual impact” of algorithms in the real world. 370
365. Waxman, supra note 364, at 336–37.
366. Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties
Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112, 134–35 (2015) (listing offices with authority to oversee NSA signals
intelligence activities).
367. For example, Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) inspector general has authority
only to oversee the disciplinary process. Office of the Inspector General, LAPD,
http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/1076
[https://perma.cc/98LUREA7]. NYPD’s inspector general has broader authority, but has clashed with the Police Benevolent
Association. Inspector General for the NYPD, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doi/offices/oignypd.page [https://perma.cc/4HFM-VE2W] (general ability
to oversee policies, programs, and operations of NYPD); John Surico, Can the New Inspector General
Really Change the NYPD?, VICE (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xd5nza/can-thisguy-really-change-the-nypd-122 [https://perma.cc/G63S-NL6R]; ‘Absolutely the Wrong Approach’:
NYPD Police Union Condemns OIG’s Recommendation to Prevent Officer Suicides, NBC NEW YORK
(Sept.
26,
2019),
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/nypd-police-union-condemnsrecommendation-to-prevent-officer-suicides/1827897/ [https://perma.cc/Z2CF-ENPR].
368. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, THE CALGANG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM: REPORT 2015130 (2016); CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 201.
369. See Andrew Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017).
370. Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189,
191 (2017).
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The SQF and gang policing examples illustrate that police might not always
comply with disclosure or auditing mandates. But perfect adherence is not the
goal. Institutionalizing transparency is important because it introduces new ways
of checking police conduct and reintroduces methods of oversight in an area that
has been outside of the frame. Intangible, privatized, and secretive investigative
methods thus raise concerns that accountability problems familiar to the national
security context might bleed over into local and state law enforcement as well.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement agencies have never had such easy access to technologies
of surveillance as they do today. And it has never been so easy for police to
operate in secret, without democratic accountability or public input. As the legal
options for checking the police dwindle, transparency law has played an outsized
role in prompting substantive reform and in mobilizing social change.
But making policing visible is about much more than exposing aggregate
data or publishing a list of intrusive police techniques. Visibility is a critical
element of democratic oversight by elected officials, legislative bodies, and
communities affected by surveillance. The proliferation of new technologies
should prompt us to ask not just what rules ought to constrain the police, but
what we need to know in order to decide what the rules ought to be. And it should
prompt us to reconsider the extent to which the informational dynamics of
modern policing, fueled by private-sector vendors and an ever-increasing hunger
for more data, intentionally stand in the way of effective oversight. These
informational dynamics do not only reflect public policy failures: they reflect a
fundamental challenge to the project of police reform and to the democratic
legitimacy of policing decisions.

